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Abstract 
From 1991 to 2002, the Sierra Leone government and the Revolutionary United Front 
waged war against each other, subjecting Sierra Leone to a civil war. This war devastated 
the nation and resulted in many human casualties. Although many researchers have 
investigated the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution, few studies have been conducted on the 
specific role of strategic processing tools used by ECOWAS during the Sierra Leone war 
to sustain a durable peace resolution in the country.  Using Galula’s conceptualization of 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution as a guide, the purpose of this qualitative, I 
used an explanatory case study to determine the elements that made strategic processing 
tools effective.  Data were collected through open ended interviews with 10 Sierra 
Leoneans that experienced the conflict, publicly available documents, and mass media 
reports related to the Sierra Leone civil war.  All data were manually coded and then 
subjected to constant comparative analytic procedures.  The key finding of this study was 
that conflict resolution was successful because intervention by ECOWAS was largely 
viewed by Sierra Leoneans favorably and legitimate. The ECOWAS use of force was 
vital for the peace process.  However, there were occurrences of human rights violations 
that were not fully resolved through the procedural mechanisms in place at the time.  The 
positive social change implications stemming from this study includes recommendations 
to ECOWAS to establish a disciplinary unit to oversee violations of international 
humanitarian law and other serious abuses by ECOWAS troops.  These actions may 
advance peace among religions, political parties, and ethnic groups in the region.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
On March 23, 1991, an intraarmed conflict started between the Sierra Leone 
government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), an insurgent resistance faction. 
The insurrection came to Sierra Leone as an extension of the civil war in the adjacent 
state of Liberia (Bell, 2000). The insurrection was the starting point of the decade-long 
civil conflict in Sierra Leone, a bloody war that resulted in substantial human rights 
violations (i.e., rape and torture) as well as ruined property and which left the nation in a 
devastated condition (Bangura, 1997; Humper, Jones, Jow, Kamara, Sooka, Schabas, & 
Torto, 2004; Basu, 2008). The conflict resulted in an estimated 50,000 civilian deaths, 
approximately 4,000 amputee survivors, 500,000 refugees, 2 million internally-displaced 
citizens, and 5,000 children recruited as soldiers by conflicting groups (Evenson, 2004). 
Additionally, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), a regional force, lost approximately 800 peacekeepers during the war 
(Rashid, 2000). As Rashid (2000) noted, the war pervaded every level and element of 
Sierra Leonean society.  
During and after the war, the Sierra Leone government, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the international community (e.g., 
the United Nations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and nongovernmental 
organizations [NGOs]) jointly cooperated on efforts and mechanisms to address and 
rectify the issues that had led to the civil war. Subsequently, they worked to redress both 
the carnage that stemmed from this conflict and to improve the sociopolitical conditions 
2 
 
of the Sierra Leone government and its people (Berewa, 2001). To accomplish these 
objectives, ECOWAS employed the strategic processing tools of counterinsurgency and 
elements of conflict resolution (e.g., diplomacy, negotiation, and mediation) to break the 
debilitating cycle of war in the country.  
A number of scholars have written on ECOWAS’s role in West African regional 
conflict resolution (Bamfo, 2013; Obi, 2009). These authors argued that an indigenous 
regional bloc (i.e., ECOWAS) should be responsible for solving internal conflict because 
of its familiarity with the culture and area. However, based on my review of the literature, 
researchers have paid little attention to ECOWAS’s important use of strategic processing 
tools in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in their involvement in regional 
conflict settlements in such places as Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, and 
Sierra Leone.  
The West African region continues to face terrorist threats in Nigeria and Mali, 
prior military coups in Guinea-Bissau, and political instability in Burkina Faso. While 
ECOWAS has engaged in various attempts at conflict resolution, it still lacks the 
essential mechanisms to manage peace and stability in the region (Aning & Salihu, 
2011). Therefore, providing ECOWAS with additional comprehensive strategies for 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution might improve security in Sierra Leone and the 
subregion as a whole. In this study, I investigated the strategic processing tools used by 
ECOWAS for the purposes of counterinsurgency and conflict resolution for maintaining 
long-lasting peace in Sierra Leone. 
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Background 
The Economic Community of West African States  
ECOWAS was established on May 28, 1975, and ratified in Lagos, Nigeria 
(Adeniran, 2013). As a regional organization, it is restricted to 15 countries or member 
states: Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo 
(Adeniran, 2012; Bamfo, 2013; Forere, 2012). ECOWAS is comprised of numerous 
branches including the authority of heads of state and governments, the Community 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Economic and Social Council, the Community 
Court of Justice, the Fund for Cooperation, the Executive Secretariat, the Department of 
Compensation, the Specialized Technical Commission, the Department of Development, 
and any other agencies that may be proposed by a member (ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 
2010; Moller, 2009). The heads of member states are the recognized leaders of each of 
ECOWAS’s regional groups. Every year, ECOWAS elects one leader to be its 
chairperson. ECOWAS convenes at least once a year, with the flexibility to congregate as 
needed in a moment of crisis (e.g., civil war and coup d’état). The executive secretary 
(i.e., the president), his deputy, and staff head (i.e., the secretariat) are limited to serving 
only two terms (Moller, 2009).  
ECOWAS intervention in regional conflicts began because of a lack of interest 
from the international community during the civil wars of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
(Arthur, 2010; Davies, 2010; Obi, 2009; Sampson, 2011). Subsequently, ECOMOG was 
formed to protect regional stability and peace (Moller, 2009). However, since its 
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formation in 1975, ECOWAS has deteriorated into socioeconomic and political 
instability, which challenges the security of the region (Bamfo, 2013). Most regional 
countries have and continue to lack the institutional capabilities and strategic tools to 
manage internal or cross-conflict crises in their sovereignties (Davies, 2010). 
Consequently, members such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, 
Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali have not been able to defend their borders or citizens from 
violent conflicts (Cham, 2012; Francis, 2009; Olonisakin, 2004). Additionally, groups 
like the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko 
Haram, and the RUF have infiltrated into adjacent nations, further threatening regional 
security and peace (Maiangwa, 2015).  
Sierra Leone and Its Conflict 
Sierra Leone is located in the subregion of West Africa, with a territory of 
approximately 71,740 square kilometers (27,699 square miles). It borders the North 
Atlantic Ocean, Guinea (652 km to the north), and Liberia (306 km to the east). The 
population estimate as of July 2013 was 5,612,685 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). 
There are 16 ethnic groups living in Sierra Leone: Koranko, Yalunka, Loko, Soso, 
Madingo, Fula, Temne, Bullom, and Limba in the North; Kono, Krim, Vai, Gola, and 
Kissi in the East; Mende in the South and East; and Sherbro in the South (Glennerster, 
Jameel, Miguel, & Rothenberg, 2011). The Western region, which includes the country’s 
capital, Freetown, was historically dominated by the Krio, but now has a diverse 
community (Glennerster et al., 2011). The natural resources found in Sierra Leone 
include diamonds, titanium ore, bauxite, iron ore, gold, and chromite (Central 
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Intelligence Agency, 2013; Elsevier, 2009; Glennerster, Jameel, Miguel, & Rothenberg, 
2011; Ndumbe, 2001).  
Sierra Leone gained its political independence from Britain on April 27, 1961. It 
was then led by Prime Minister Milton Margai and the Sierra Leone People’s Party. 
When Margai died in 1964, his brother Albert Margai succeeded him as the head of the 
country and party until 1967, when Siaka Stevens, leader of the All People’s Congress, 
won the March 22 general election and became the head of the nation’s government 
(Arthur, 2010). Upon President Stevens’ retirement on November 28, 1985, he selected 
Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh to rule the country.  
The decade of the 1990s has been associated with sociopolitical instability in 
Sierra Leone. For instance, in 1992, Captain Valentine Strasser deposed President 
Momoh in a military coup because of his inability to deal with rebellion, consequently 
forming the National Provisional Ruling Council (Bamfo, 2013, Davies, 2010; Dumbuya, 
2008). In 1996, Vice President Brigadier Julius Maada Bio ousted Captain Strasser from 
power. In the same year, Maada Bio held a national election that returned the country to a 
civilian government, which was won by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone 
People’s Party (Obi, 2009). In 1997, Major Johnny Paul Koroma successfully overthrew 
the government for the second time and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council, an action condemned by ECOWAS, the African Union, the international 
community, and the United Nations (Bamfo, 2013, Davies, 2010; Dumbuya, 2008). In 
1998, ECOWAS’s multilateral armed force, known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), and the civil defense forces (Kamajors) removed the junta and its ally, the 
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RUF, from power (Bamfo, 2013, Davies, 2010). The regional bloc restored President 
Kabbah to office, and he served another term through the general election of 2002. Ernest 
Bai Koroma of the All People’s Congress was elected president in the 2007 and 2012 
general elections through a democratic transition (Bamfo, 2013; Davies, 2010; Dumbuya, 
2008; Obi, 2009). In March 2018, Julius Maada Bio became president of the nation.   
According to some scholars (Aning & Atuobi, 2011; Davies, 2010; Iyer, 2011; Le 
Billon & Levin, 2009), the All People’s Congress’ abuse of power from 1968-1992 may 
have been a source of Sierra Leone’s brutal conflict. President Stevens’ policies from 
1968-1985—which suppressed opposition, enriched himself and his immediate circle, 
repressed rural leaders, rigged elections, and caused general corruption and persistent 
poverty—laid the foundation for the war, in the view of some experts (Aning & Atuobi, 
2011; Davies, 2010). President Stevens surrounded himself with a well-equipped Internal 
Security Unit from his clan (Limba) and marginalized the army. He also took bribes from 
Lebanese businessmen and ignored the rampant unemployment, poor living and 
education, and low salaries of his people, all of which contributed to a failed state (Aning 
& Atuobi, 2011; Davies, 2010). These conditions paved the way for insurgency and 
assisted the RUF in enticing civilians to rise up against the government (Aning & Atuobi, 
2011; Davies, 2010). During this conflict, the RUF aimed to topple the corrupt regime of 
the All People’s Congress and was supported by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
and other adjacent nations in the region such as Burkina Faso (Atuobi, 2011; Millar, 
2012; Mokuwa, Voors, Bulte, & Richards, 2011). President Momoh inherited a weakened 
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government in 1985, and failed to improve the deteriorating situation, following in the 
footsteps of his predecessor (Aning & Atuobi, 2011; Bamfo, 2013; Davies, 2010). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Sierra Leonean government’s overall hostility toward 
students led to the creation of a movement of radicalized urban youth insurgents, which 
further contributed to the conflict (Davies, 2010). This movement was influenced by 
increased levels of youth literacy, contact with other cultures, drugs, the dissemination of 
radical dogmas and beliefs, and the socioeconomic stagnation of the nation, which led to 
corruption and economic dilemmas, such as pervasive youth unemployment (Davies, 
2010; Enuka, 2012). By 1987, students from Fourah Bay College and other educational 
institutions had become the frontline insurgency movement against the government’s 
oppression. Foday Sankoh and others embarked to Libya for military training and 
returned to Sierra Leone to start the civil war in 1991, which subsequently ended in 2002 
(Davies, 2010; Enuka, 2012). 
Problem Statement 
Conflict and resulting crises and instability have characterized the experience of 
everyday life in the subregion of West Africa since the early 1990s. The western region 
of Africa is the continent’s most unstable and prone-to-conflict region (Arthur, 2010; 
Davies, 2010; Obi, 2009). In the 1990s, Liberia’s civil wars produced an unprecedented 
amount of bloodshed, humanitarian crises, and cross-border conflicts (Draman & 
Carment, 2003; Williams & Haacke, 2008). In 1991, the Liberian conflict expanded into 
Sierra Leone and led to the destruction of the entire social and economic fabric of the 
country (Aning & Atuobi, 2011).  
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ECOWAS acted quickly to end the conflict in the region (Arthur, 2010; 
Goldmann, 2005; Obi, 2009). Yet, for the two decades that ECOWAS has been involved 
in regional conflict, the group has never possessed solid strategic processing tools in 
place for counterinsurgency and conflict resolutions, according to Cubitt, 2011, Aning & 
Atuobi, 2011; Davies, 2010. Many articles have been written on ECOWAS’s role in 
peacekeeping and diplomatic relations in the region, especially in areas of conflict (Aning 
& Salihu, 2011; Davies, 2010). However, researchers have paid little attention to the 
importance of strategic processing tools in ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict 
resolution, according to my review of the literature. In this study, I explored the strategic 
processing tools used as part of ECOWAS’s engagement in counterinsurgency and 
conflict resolution to maintain a durable peace settlement in Sierra Leone. In doing so, I 
have constructed an information base to advance comprehension of the conflict and the 
forces or elements that encroached on it. The results of the research serve as a model for 
future studies on counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in the region. Additionally, I 
provide recommendations to address further conflict in the subregion of West Africa.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative, explanatory case study was to examine the 
strategic processing tools used by ECOWAS in its counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution efforts to sustain a durable peace resolution in Sierra Leone and to determine 
the elements that led to the tools’ effectiveness. ECOWAS’s conflict resolution 
experience started with ECOMOG’s engagement in the Liberian civil war, which then 
expanded to Sierra Leone (Davies, 2010). The results of this study provide guidance for 
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ECOWAS leaders and those of other relevant groups on how to manage potential 
insurrection, terrorism, or conflict in the subregion effectively, such as that caused by 
Boko Haram in Nigeria or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali. Because previous 
researchers have shown little interest in ECOWAS’s strategies of conflict settlements in 
region (Aning & Salihu, 2011), I concluded that supplementary study was needed to 
assist leaders who make policies concerning conflict, peace, security, and social 
development in the region.  
Significance 
ECOWAS has played a significant role in managing regional conflict, though 
managing security remains hectic (Aning, 2009; Arthur, 2010; Obi, 2009). I aimed to 
assist ECOWAS in managing conflict issues effectively. The study proposes to help 
regional leaders and policymakers to formulate strategic policies to control insurgency, 
counterinsurgency, and conflict resolution and prevention in the region. Likewise, the 
research envisions to provide ECOWAS with strategies to produce positive social change 
and peaceful coexistence between all peoples in a region, such as conflict-ridden 
territories in Sierra Leone. Finally, the study projects to contribute to the literature on 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution, by detailing the strategic processing tools used 
to maintain a durable peace in Sierra Leone that were absent from the literature. I 
explored the actions of ECOWAS, the Sierra Leone government, and the United Nations, 
as detailed in scholarly resources and primary research.  
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Theoretical Framework 
The conceptual framework for this study derived from literature on 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution based on Galula’s (1964) work. According to 
Galula, military power is insufficient for conflict or counterinsurgency resolution. Rather, 
conflict resolution requires strategic processing tools, such as mediation, political and 
economic power, peacekeeping, involved citizens, and the government’s support (Galula, 
2006). This theoretical framework was used to investigate ECOWAS’s attempts to 
control conflict through the processes of counterinsurgency and conflict resolution. This 
work also guided the research study by providing a framework to understand the strategic 
processing tools of counterinsurgency and conflict resolution, as further discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
Research Questions 
To explore the history of the Sierra Leone conflict and ECOWAS’s involvement 
in the region, I posed the following three research questions: 
RQ1. What were the strategic processing tools ECOWAS employed in 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain durable peace in Sierra 
Leone? 
RQ2. How did these strategic processing tools sustain durable peace in Sierra 
Leone? 
RQ3. What elements, including regional issues, influenced the effectiveness of 
the ECOWAS’s engagement in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in 
Sierra Leone?  
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Nature of the Study 
I used a qualitative method with an explanatory case study design. This design 
was the most appropriate for this study because counterinsurgencies were complex 
phenomena that were intrinsically connected to their context, such as the geopolitics of 
the country in which these occurred (Coker, 2012; Hughes, 2012). Case studies are useful 
for studying a phenomenon within its context, while maintaining its complexity 
(Woodside, 2010; Yin, 2013). Explanatory case studies are utilized when the researcher 
seeks to explain and describe the causal links between real-life interventions and their 
outcomes (Yin, 2013). I collected and triangulated different data (e.g., government 
memorandums, protocols, policy documents, case notes, and NGO resources) on 
ECOWAS’s role in conflict resolution in the region. Archival data regarding the 
insurgency were collected from libraries in Freetown, Sierra Leone, with a particular 
focus on the period from 1991 to 2002. Documentary data were coded to derive the 
prevalent themes therein. This documentary data was then used to triangulate the data 
derived from the interviews and field notes.  
I conducted unstructured interviews with Sierra Leoneans in Sierra Leone and 
New York City in the United States to collect personal narratives and observational field 
notes regarding the civil conflict and/or the ECOWAS’s interventions in Sierra Leone. 
The targeted sample for this study was 10 participants from the groups listed above. The 
interviews occurred in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone and New York, U.S.A. As 
required, I traveled to the aforementioned field sites, and utilized telephone and email 
communication.  
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Data analysis used both computer and manual strategies. I manually recorded and 
coded documents, such as interview transcripts, field notes, and non-electronic data 
documents from the government and ECOWAS for easy classification, retrieval, and 
information analysis. I then electronically transferred these documents into a digital file 
for further storage, coding, and data analysis. Electronic forms and documents from 
libraries and ECOWAS were downloaded to a computer (or portable device) for later 
analysis. I utilized both digital and non-electronic strategies for data backup, data 
interpretation, and classification of information accuracy. I used NVivo for data analysis 
as mandated by the research. The research results derived from product of the coding of 
the interview and the documentary data. The data were triangulated, which added validity 
to the data. I intended to disseminate the recommendations to ECOWAS through its 
members, universities, libraries, and official website. Finally, the study had anticipated to 
present the recommendations in conferences to propagate the information and send a 
copy to ECOWAS’s headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria.     
Assumptions 
The following assumptions were made in this study. Participants truthfully 
answered my questions from their knowledge of the phenomena. The official records and 
archival data were accurate. 
Scope 
I explore the role of ECOWAS in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in 
Sierra Leone. The subjects in the study comprised of individuals who experienced the 
civil war in Sierra Leone, including ECOWAS members and representatives, members of 
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the Sierra Leone public, United Nations officials, and Mano River Union members who 
witnessed the civil conflict. I targeted around 10 participants, though data collection 
might end at a smaller number if deemed unnecessary to include a larger sample size due 
to repetition and consistency in formation (i.e., if saturation was reached). The 
participants for this study were recruited from Freetown and New York City, all of which 
housed a large demographic of relevant populations for this study. Archival data and 
official records on the civil war and ECOWAS’s involvement were also studied and used 
in the triangulation of data. 
Delimitations 
The following delimitations applied to this study. Participants were aged 30 years 
and above, from Sierra Leone, who experienced the civil war. Gender was not limited. I 
focused only on ECOWAS’s engagement in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in 
Sierra Leone. Only archival data from the Freetown main library and authentic academic 
resources regarding the ECOWAS’s engagement in counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution in Sierra Leone were collected. 
Limitations 
The following limitations applied to this study. As the researcher focuses on the 
exploration of ECOWAS’s role in Sierra Leone only, the results might not be 
generalizable to other regions without further study due to economic, cultural, social, and 
political differences between regions. Participation in the study was limited to individuals 
in Sierra Leone and New York who experienced the civil war. Thus, the perspective of 
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ECOWAS members directly involved in the counterinsurgency was not included in the 
study.  
Definition of Terms 
African Union: The organization previously known as the Organization of African 
Unity.  
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A Muslim militant group in North Africa and 
Mali. 
Boko Haram: A Muslim militant group that wants to enforce Islamic Shari’a or 
law in northern Nigeria. It has committed heinous crimes against Nigerians 
indiscriminately. Literally translated, it means “Western education is forbidden or 
sacrilege.” 
Conflict resolution (CR): Cooperation among opposing parties striving to improve 
their situation as well as end conflict in plausible ways that benefit all parties. 
Counterinsurgency: Forces who deal with insurgent groups who want to remove a 
legitimate government through violence, force, or other means. 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): An organization 
established on May 28, 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria. As a regional organization, it is 
restricted to 15 member states: Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Liberia, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
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The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG): 
Military forces drawn from ECOWAS member states’ armed forces to keep peace in 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire. 
The National Patriotic Front of Liberia: A rebel group in Liberia led by Charles 
Taylor.  
Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence (PMAD): A 1981 Assistance on 
Defense Matters conference in Sierra Leone that authorized ECOMOG’s intervention in 
the conflict. 
Protocol of Nonaggression: A 1978 protocol to settle resolution disputes between 
ECOWAS members’ intra- and interconflicts. 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF): A rebel group led by Foday Sanko that 
committed crimes against Sierra Leoneans from 1991-2002.  
The Status of Forces Agreement: President Kabbah’s appeal to ECOWAS 
Chairman General Abacha of Nigeria for support under the SOFA and other mutual 
treaties between the two governments. 
Sierra Leone (SL): An independent country located in West Africa. 
The United Nations Observation Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): An 
intervention created to supervise disarmament, demobilization, and training procedures 
directly to assure that the new Sierra Leone Army would abide by international 
humanitarian rules. 
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Summary 
The Sierra Leone civil war inspired by RUF insurgents led to the destruction of 
the country and caused a humanitarian catastrophe in the subregion. I explore the 
strategic processing tools used by ECOWAS during counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution operations in Sierra Leone using a qualitative explanatory case study method. 
Ten participants of Sierra Leoneans were interviewed. Archival data were also examined. 
Undertaking this study contributes to literature on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and 
conflict resolution. It might also assist in managing conflict issues effectively. Chapter 2 
had included a literature review of the concepts relevant to this study, as well as common 
themes in similar studies. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine and synthesize scholarship regarding the role of 
ECOWAS in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in Sierra Leone. The chapter 
includes a comprehensive review of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks used by 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution groups, such as ECOMOG. I also address 
current problems confronting practitioners and researchers in the field and identify areas 
requiring further research.  
Literature Search Strategy 
I retrieved the literature from various online periodical databases, including policy 
and administration databases such as EBSCOhost, Academic Search Complete, ProQuest 
Central, and Political Science Complete (Sage). I also searched military and government 
collections (e.g., ECOWAS/ECOMOG protocols and U.S. Field Manual 3-24), the 
International Security and Counterterrorism Reference Center, dissertation databases 
(e.g., Academic Search Complete), and the Freetown main library in Sierra Leone. A 
subject or word search method was employed for such terms as war, peace, conflict 
resolution, insurgency, and counterinsurgency.  
Theoretical Framework 
Galula’s (1964) work about insurgency and counterinsurgency attached to the 
understanding of a revolutionary war. Galula defined revolutionary war as “primarily an 
internal conflict, although external influences seldom fail to bear upon it” (p. 3). 
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Insurgency is a civil war where there are national groups challenging the local rule or the 
existing administration, police, and armed forces.  
Galula (1964) discussed several key differences between insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. First, the two have different objectives. According to Galula, a 
revolutionary war is a political war because the objective is the population itself where 
operations are designed to win it over (in the case of insurgents) or to keep it submissive 
(in the case of counterinsurgents). Second, insurgency is cheap, while counterinsurgency 
is costly (Galula, 1964). This is mainly because the insurgent group only has the 
objective to promote disorder, which is very cheap to create. On the other hand, 
preventing disorder is very costly. For instance, when insurgents burn a farm, farmers 
will clamor that they did not receive protection. If the farmers are not satisfied with 
response of the counterinsurgents, then the farmers could make a deal with the insurgent 
group. Third, insurgents are fluid while counterinsurgents are rigid (Galula, 1964). The 
insurgents are fluid because they do not have responsibility to prevent disorder and do not 
have concrete assets such as infrastructures. The counterinsurgents are rigid because they 
have both responsibility and tangible assets, such as buildings. 
There are also prerequisites for a successful insurgency: (a) a cause, (b) weakness 
of the counterinsurgent, (c) geographic conditions, and (d) outside support (Galula, 
1964). Insurgents need an attractive cause in order to recruit members and supporters. 
With an appropriate and attractive cause, the insurgent is formidable. For the insurgent to 
plan and implement effective attacks, the insurgent group needs to identify the 
weaknesses of the counterinsurgent (Galula, 1964; 2006a). Some of the weaknesses 
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include presence of problems, absence of national consensus, lack of knowledge about 
counterinsurgent warfare, and weak political structure. 
Several factors affect the success of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. 
Geography factors can also serve as a weakness for insurgent groups or a strength for 
counterinsurgent groups. The location of the country is an important factor. A country 
isolated by natural barriers or countries that oppose insurgency is advantageous to the 
counterinsurgent. The larger the country, the more difficult it is for the government or 
counterinsurgents to control insurgency (Galula, 1964). A country, which is easy to 
compartmentalize, is advantageous to counterinsurgents. International borders also affect 
the success of insurgency. If neighboring countries support the insurgents, then it is 
advantageous to the insurgents. If the terrain of the country is rugged and difficult, then it 
is advantageous to the insurgents. Harsh climates favor counterinsurgent forces. The 
population also affects revolutionary war. The more people there are in a country, the 
more difficult it is to control it. The economy of the country can be either an advantage or 
disadvantage to counterinsurgent forces (Gulula, 1964). The advantage economy tries to 
address people’s basic needs and to stop insurgent propaganda. The disadvantage 
economy is unable to manage people’s needs and to stop insurgency in the country.   
Outside support to an insurgent group can take different forms (Galula, 1964). 
Moral support can be expressed through communications media. Political support can be 
demonstrated through direct or indirect communication with the counterinsurgent. 
Technical support includes political and military operations. Financial support can be 
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overt or covert. Military support can be demonstrated through direct intervention to the 
insurgent’s side. 
Galula (1964) also discussed the two periods of revolutionary war from the 
perspective of the counterinsurgent: 
1. The “cold revolutionary war” is when the insurgent’s activity remains on the 
whole legal and nonviolent (Galula, 1964, p. 59). 
2. The “hot revolutionary war” is when the insurgent’s activity becomes openly 
illegal and violent. (Galula, 1964, p. 59). 
Galula further discussed that the essential problem for counterinsurgent stems from the 
fact that actual danger will always appear to the country as out of proportion and not 
adequately addressed. The question remains on how and when counterinsurgent should 
proceed when dealing with insurgent groups. Galula provided four general courses of 
action for the counterinsurgent: 
1. COIN may act directly on the insurgent leaders (Galula, 1964, p. 60).  
2. COIN may act indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency 
(Galula, 1964, p. 60).  
3. COIN may infiltrate the insurgent movement and try to make it ineffective 
(Galula, 1964, p. 60). 
4. COIN may build up or reinforce his political machine (Galula, 1964, p. 60). 
Galula (1964) also provided laws and principles of counterinsurgency warfare. 
The first law is that the population’s support is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as it 
is for the insurgent (Galula, 1964). The second law is that support is gained through 
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active minority (Galula, 1964). The third law is that support from the population is 
conditional (Galula, 1964). The fourth law is that intensity of vastness of means and 
efforts are essential (Galula, 1964). In the next section, I will discuss the concept of 
conflict. 
Conflict 
In the germinal book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Galula, 
1964, 2006), French Military Officer and Scholar, Galula (1964), indicated that war is not 
similar to a game of chess that is bounded and may be analyzed completely; rather, war is 
a vast social phenomenon that involves an infinite number of variables that may not 
easily be analyzed. Over the last decade, Galula’s works have defined the theory and 
practice of counterinsurgency and influenced contemporary defense experts and 
publications including the U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency Manual (2006, 2009). Galula 
(1964) recognized that war, as it had been known until the modern era, was no longer a 
readily definable activity, an issue that subsequent scholars would grapple with as well. 
War would become small wars, to use Kilcullen’s (2009, 2010) term, which reflects the 
fracturing of definable warfare into a series of conflicts.  
Conflict, then, is not always war. War, as it has been understood, is an organized 
structure composed of armies, uniforms, and codes of conduct with a hierarchy that is 
responsible for making decisions. It also has a chain of command parallel to but separates 
from the civilian government. Conflict is amorphous and transient, with shifting 
presumed leaders for mostly unorganized militias that can be difficult to contain. Conflict 
and resolution are constants in human history, and many believe that conflict is 
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unavoidable due to human nature and/or the competitive nature of nation states and 
individuals (Alliez & Negri, 2003; Banks, 1987; Burton, 1972; Hobbes, as cited in 
Sadler, 2009; Laue, 1987; Sandole, 2009). Conflicts are specific to a region, with each 
different from another in any number of factors. Conflict can also resemble a civil war or 
sheer wholesale anarchy. The Sierra Leone conflict involved familial, economic, and 
political overtones; as a result, West Africa became prone to conflict (Aning & Atuobi, 
2011). While both war and conflict are insidious, war requires a context beyond the civil 
conflict in Sierra Leone. 
Byrne and Senehi (2009) argued that conflict was the result of various 
circumstances. Moreover, conflict occurs within inter-/intrapersonal and/or intergroup or 
institutional spheres. Conflict has many forms and descriptive classifications. Conflicts 
usually take place when individuals, organizations, or nations have incompatible 
objectives. In other words, conflicts start when the interests of two or more parties clash, 
and at least one of the conflicting parties, searches for its interests at the expense of the 
opposing party’s welfare (Humphreys, 2005). Therefore, conflict is a social phenomenon 
that often stems from immediate or ongoing transformations that lead to different goals 
and needs (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000). Thus, the four elements of conflict are the actors, 
the resource in dispute, the stake that each actor has in the resource, and the stage and 
length that the conflict has reached (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; Fisher, 2009). 
Burton (1972) described conflict as a means for changing several essential 
components of society, such as welfare, security, justice, and opportunities for social 
development. Burton noted that suppressing war can cause societies to become static. The 
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author also noted that international conflicts are, in effect, an extended form of internal 
conflict. For example, the first Liberian civil war drew adjacent states into the conflict, 
including Sierra Leone, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire. For 
example, according to Doucey (2011) and Burton (1990a, 1990b), conflict occurs when 
authorities, institutions, organizations, individuals, or communities fail in meeting the 
needs and common concerns of their people. Kelman (2009) added that a society’s shared 
needs and fears were far more influential in any given conflict than the national interests 
of those involved.  
In 2010, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program only recorded 30 active armed 
conflicts. They defined armed conflict as conflict with a minimum of 25 battle-related 
deaths. According to the report, this reduction is substantial compared to the 36 conflicts 
recorded for 2009, because this type of drop in magnitude has only been recorded four 
times since the post-1946 period and is the lowest since 2010. An important part of this 
trend is the reduction of conflicts in Africa. Moreover, this trend is within a greater 
decline in the number of conflicts since the end of the Cold War (Kriesberg, 2015; 
Themner & Wallensteen, 2011).  
Conflict Resolution 
The theoretical concept of conflict resolution involves the use of cooperation, 
collaboration, or coordination (the three Cs) among two or more opposing 
parties/enemies striving to improve their situation as well as end conflict in plausible 
ways that benefit all parties (Byrne & Senehi, 2009; Fisher, 2009). Parties in the conflict 
are permitted by third parties, such as ECOWAS, to participate fully in the resolution 
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process to resolve their grievances. Conflict resolution aims to avoid zero-sum game, 
where the gain of one group is the loss of the other. This issue was the situation in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire; as such, when insurgents in these nations resumed 
conflicts, ECOWAS was forced to reengage in new conflict resolution processes in the 
region (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009; Oksamytna, 2013). 
Burton (1972) determined three imperative elements to distinguish between 
conflict settlement and conflict resolution: “the degree of third-party coercive 
intervention, the degree of participation by the conflicting parties, and the degree of 
communication between the parties” (p. 150). According to the author, many strategic 
processing tools can be used to address conflicts, including judicial settlement, 
arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and negotiation. Burton (1972) maintained that the 
negotiation is more advantageous than the other tools because its results are not 
obligatory for any conflicting party. The parties can also conduct face-to-face discussion, 
augment communication, and decrease external involvement or compulsion in the 
resulting negotiation settlement (Byrne & Senehi, 2009; Fisher, 2009). 
Burton (1990) noted four common needs that serve as strategic tools to reach 
productive outcomes for any conflict resolution settlement: (a) security needs (e.g., 
stability and safety), (b) identity needs (the recognition of one’s own specific identity and 
acceptance of others), (c) family and community needs (e.g., housing, education, 
healthcare, justice, and equality), and (d) personal needs (e.g., development and 
achievement of one’s potential in society). According to Burton (1990), the failure to 
meet these stated needs will result in conflict. Cook-Huffman (2009) added that conflict 
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results from the sense that one’s identity was in danger, which led to the feeling that one 
must fight to survive.  
Burton (1990) and Fisher (2009) maintained that conflict resolution relied on the 
formulation of decisions that made the need for force unnecessary when addressing the 
roots of a conflict and settled these in ways acceptable to all relevant parties. This study 
affirms that conflict resolution must be based on pragmatic and practical proofs to assist 
conflicting parties in identifying essential human needs and arriving at a resolution. 
However, there may be reasonable questions as to these choices, and a realistic analysis 
of the means may be necessary to guarantee the satisfaction of various groups. Rummel 
(1981) attested the aim of conflict resolution was to curtail conflict and avoid unintended 
and negative results of the resolution. Rummel (1981) also argued for the importance of 
predicting, planning, and compromising for conflict. Successful negotiation involves the 
ability and willingness of all factions to arrive at a collective position of reciprocal 
exchange, a solution where everyone benefits. Doucey (2011) and Sandole, Byrne, 
Sandole-Staroste, and Senehi (2009) asserted that the current practice of conflict 
resolution faced several challenges, requiring new comprehensive and holistic methods to 
manage both external and internal conflict issues. Burton (1990) and Doucey (2011) 
argued that sustainable peace could not be achieved if the primary needs of people were 
absent and/or excluded from the process.  
War 
 Several authors have attempted to determine the causes of war, which may not 
always be a single source (Cashman, 2013; Dafoe, Renshon, & Huth, 2014; W. R. 
26 
 
Thompson & Levy, 2011; & Levy, 2010). W. R. Thompson and Levy (2010) presented 
an exhaustive account on the theories that determined the causes of conflict, in terms of 
war in particular. According to the authors, most studies regarding the causes of war stem 
from realist theories, a school of thought that dates back to Thucydides’s discussion of 
the Peloponnesian War and further shaped by philosophers and social theorists such as 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. Realist theories have several schools of thought but 
are brought together by several common themes.  
Realist Theory 
First, in realist theory, sovereign states are considered the key actors in world 
politics. These sovereign states act rationally to improve their security, power, and wealth 
in an international system that is governed by anarchy (Rana, 2015; W. R. Thompson & 
Levy, 2010). The international system is anarchic, because no legitimate governmental 
authority is capable of mediating disputes and enforcing agreements between these 
sovereign state actors. This anarchy, and the resulting uncertainty regarding the intentions 
of other sovereign states, produces insecurity and competition for power. Thus, according 
to the proponents of realist theory, conflict is inherent to the international system as a 
result of insecurity, conflicts of interest, and international rivalries (Cashman, 2013; W. 
R. Thompson & Levy, 2010). Conflict can be avoided by the distribution of power 
throughout this international system.  
Two paths towards war. Within this theory, are two main paths to war. The first, 
according to the authors, is when two states have direct conflicts of interest and one or 
both decide to achieve their interests through the use of force. The second path to war is 
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when a state prefers to maintain the status quo. This war is primarily aimed at fulfilling a 
goal of security, and such wars are called inadvertent wars because neither nation wants 
or expects the conflict to occur at the onset. This second path to war is the result of 
uncertainty. The more power that one state accrues, the higher the chance that another 
attempts to account for the resulting uncertainty through force.  
The spiral and deterrence models. This second path is crucial to the spiral 
model, which states that prefer peace to war are brought to war because they want to 
preserve the status quo. Examples of this phenomenon can be seen in World War I and 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (W. R. Thompson & Levy, 2010). In contrast, the 
deterrence model is used to indicate that wars can occur when deterrence fails as a result 
of a lack of credibility or lack of military power. Thus, for adherents of the deterrence 
mode, the only method for maintaining peace is ensuring that all actors are sufficiently 
prepared for war. Unlike the spiral model, the war in the deterrence model is the result of 
lacking activity (that adequately deters aggression from other states), rather than a 
response to an action that threatens the status quo.  
Reputation and status. Reputation has also been seen as an important motivating 
status for war (Dafoe, Renshon, & Huth, 2014). According to Dafoe et al. (2014), 
reputation is beginning to become accepted as a reasonable motive for war. The 
researchers defined reputation as the perceived status of a group or nation with respect to 
the facets of wealth and power, and noted that prestige and status have strategic 
significance, such as in deterrence, when reputation can play a part in how one state 
determines the invention of the other (Dafoe et al., 2014; W. R. Thompson & Levy, 
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2010). The authors also made a case for reconciling cognitive and strategic approaches, 
such that international relation literature also consider insights from psychological, 
cultural, and other frameworks. Such consideration recognizes that state actors are not 
entirely rational and give insight to their thought process when considering their actions 
within the international stage.  
Constructivism. The constructivist theory of war is a relatively new theory used 
in international relations studies. This theory is related to the constructivist theories in the 
social sciences, which are inductive-relativist theories in reaction to the empirical-
positivist theories that came before (Stam, 2010). It emphasizes ideational and cultural 
factors when examining states and their actions (Cashman, 2013; Dafoe et al., 2014). 
According to constructivist theory, international politics are socially constructed, which is 
an extension of the belief that reality as a whole is composed of constructs. As such, the 
creation of identities and norms are important mechanisms in the international relations 
process, and both significantly affect the behavior of states (Cashman, 2013). The most 
important difference between constructivist theory and other prevailing theories is that 
appropriateness is considered more important than consequences. Thus, the context in 
which events occur is thoroughly considered, and it is within such contexts that decisions 
are evaluated.  
Moreover, for constructivists, the anarchy that characterizes the international 
community for the realists are replaced with different structures, as a result of treaties, 
rules, norms, and institutions. These structures allow more agencies on the part of actors, 
because these structures are mutually-constructed. The actors all participate in creating 
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such structures, which are ordered, unlike the world ruled by anarchy that is prevalent in 
realist theories. Specifically, constructivists note that the concept of anarchy is itself 
context-dependent and there is no reason that two states in an archaic system should 
regard each other with the distrust omnipresent in realist theories (Cashman, 2013). 
According to Cashman (2013), any mutual distrust or animosity must be the result of 
identity or context that results in such in constructivist theory. Thus, structure and context 
are the most important considerations when examining international relations through the 
constructivist theory.  
Types of Wars 
 Various authors have attempted to describe types of warfare and to describe the 
different types of warfare that have occurred throughout history (Colarik & Janczewski, 
2012; Passman, 2015). For example, an emerging type of warfare is cyber warfare, which 
takes advantage of technological advances that involve the acquisition, dissemination, 
and utilization of information (Colarik & Janczewski, 2012; Nguyen, 2013; Shin, Cheon, 
& Eom, 2014; Wiley & Coyle, 2013). A cyber-attack is when computers or computer 
networks are used in the capacity of weapons (Nguyen, 2013; Shin et al., 2014). The 
most common forms of these attacks are penetration attacks, in which vulnerabilities in a 
computer system are used to access resources or implant malicious software, and denial-
of-service attacks, which diminish the functionality of the computer system, usually until 
it cannot be used (Nguyen, 2013). Nguyen (2013) also showed that cyber warfare 
presents different types of challenges because of its difference from more traditional 
types of offense. For example, cyber attacks are from a remote origin, such and thus do 
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not involve the possibility of harm for the attacker. Moreover, unlike traditional attacks, 
the effects of cyber attacks are reversible, because data can be restored or fixed, given 
certain situations.  
In another study, Passman (2015) attempted to explain his fractal concept of war. The 
author advanced the mathematics used for combat simulation and predictive models 
through the uses of fractal mathematics. Prior to this development, military operational 
research used Lanchester equations, which describe Industrial Age warfare and were 
developed during the First World War, rather than the more prevalent and current 
Information Age warfare. Information Age warfare usually includes dynamically-
evolving scenarios with local force clustering and re-clustering. This fractal concept of 
war is important to this literature review, because it is a model of how war is understood 
in a practical setting, especially for high-level simulations that are used by the military 
for actual decisions. The fractal model of war is, therefore; a type of war that is intimately 
tied not only to the sociological study of war but also to the praxis of war, which is an 
important domain to consider. The limitations of the previously-dominant Lanchester 
model are also limitations levied against a grounded framework of war. The limitations 
are the following: 
1. Constant attrition rate coefficients; 
2. No force movement in space; 
3. Homogeneous forces; 
4. Battle termination not described; 
5. Deterministic as opposed to stochastic; 
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6. Not verified against historical data; 
7. Cannot predict attrition rate coefficients; 
8. Tactical decisions processes are not modeled; 
9. Battlefield intelligence not considered; 
10. Command and control not considered. (Passman, 2015, pp. 151-152) 
In contrast, fractal war equations can be used to analyze large amounts of historical 
analysis that can contribute to war simulations, represent the dynamic between attrition 
and maneuver warfare, as well as produce a unified field theory for combat. Passman 
(2015) proceeded to show several applications of fractal mathematical concepts, such as 
fractals, self-organization, self-similarity, and scale-free systems, to explain that it is 
possible to use this branch of mathematics to examine, model, and predict combat 
processes.  
Insurgency 
Insurgency is an ideological and sociological problem that has been and remains 
an unwelcome phenomenon in the human endeavor. It often stems from legitimate 
complaints of injustice against governmental authorities. Insurgency is often preceded by 
other forms of action, such as rebellion and resistance (Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010; 
Petraeus, Amos, & McClure, 2009). Marks (2005) argued that both rebellion and 
resistance were events that would lead to the formation of an insurgency and could be 
assimilated into an armed political apparatus. Marks maintained that contemporary 
insurgencies were no longer parochial to an individual state but were transforming into 
transnational insurgencies that could subvert regional security and peace. Besides, 
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Cromartie (2012) observed that the prolonged nature of insurgency differentiated it from 
a revolution or a coup. Insurgency relies on violence. It also involves waiting for the best 
time to use violence to its advantage. Insurgency thus uses a strategic doctrine of offense, 
defense, and devolution to reach its goal.  
Since Galula’s work on counterinsurgency warfare and pacification in Algeria in 
the 1950s and 1960s, field manuals have become the most current and informative source 
for scholars in this field (Kilcullen, 2010; Petraeus, Amos, & McClure, 2009). The Army 
field manual is a credible source because top U.S. military experts, scholars, and 
practitioners in the field collaborated to produce The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual. For example, General David Petraeus (PhD-Princeton) and the team have 
several scholars with doctorates in history, political science, and anthropology. The 
manual had reviewed many scholarly works of literature in the study of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. The most notable sources were the works of Galula, R. Thompson 
(1966), T. E. Lawrence, and Mao Zedong. The manual had influenced scholars in this 
field to do further researches in examining the relevance of the FM in the current surge of 
insurgency around the globe. Moreover, it has also been published as a book, which is 
considered a primary source in counterinsurgency. The University of Chicago Press also 
published the field manual, which means that the university supports the information in 
the manual.  
The U.S. Army’s Field Manual 3-24 (2006) defined insurgency as: 
An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government 
through the use of subversion and armed conflict. [It can also be] an organized, 
33 
 
protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and 
legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political 
authority while increasing insurgent control. (p. 1) 
This definition has been widely adopted in subsequent publications (Kilcullen, 
2010; Marks, 2005; Nagl, 2002; Sewall, 2007; Snyder, 2011). Galula (1964) further 
asserted that an insurgency was gradual and extensive effort conducted to remove an 
existing authority by any means necessary. The author stated that insurgency was local by 
nature; therefore, solving it required local solutions (Cromartie, 2012; Galula, 2006). 
Galula (2006) further noted that conflicts were too complex to forecast precisely when 
and where an insurgency would erupt. 
An insurgency has numerous triggers, including fighting for independence, 
religious and ethnic conflict, and uprisings against foreign military presence within a 
conflict (Kilcullen, 2009; Petraeus et al., 2009). Insurgents will opportunistically or 
legitimately exploit a people’s grievances against their government, for example, the 
failure to provide basic needs, corruption, or the breach of individual rights. For reasons 
unique to their conflict, insurgents often argue that their needs are unsolvable by the state, 
even through peaceful resolution (Mattis, 2006). Insurgents hope to ignite a general 
desire for defiance to achieve their political objectives. However, insurgent movements 
can only prosper when most of the populace supports or is neutral concerning the 
motives, philosophy, and practice of the group (Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010).  
There are several prerequisites common to successful insurgencies. First, there 
must be a susceptible population hardened with grievances against the authorities, which 
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insurgents exploit to rise against the legitimate regime (Zimmerman, 2007). Second, there 
must be available leadership and guidance (Kilcullen, 2009; Petraeus & Amos, 2006). 
This leadership will position itself as the best alternative to the existing regime by 
providing resources temporarily to address the citizens’ needs. Third, governmental 
authorities must demonstrate incompetence and/or have weak control of the state (Galula 
1964, 2006; Kilcullen, 2010; Zimmerman, 2007), and incapable of attending to the 
essential needs of its populace. 
The Process of Insurgency 
There are five primary phases in an insurgent movement (Petraeus et al., 2009; 
Sewall et al., 2007). First, a leader is charismatic, able to plan, and appeals to the masses. 
The leader must have the aptitude to disseminate the philosophical ideology of the 
insurgency to its target and the population at large, and guide guerrilla activities. Second, 
guerrilla activity occurs. The insurgents use a range of weapons to conduct their fight, 
which soon involves the community. Insurgent tactics utilize time, space, and 
determination. Insurgents often appear to pull back to deceive counterinsurgency forces, 
and regularly acknowledge short-term defeat to achieve their long-term objectives 
(Austin, 2009; Marks, 2005). Third, an active underground movement develops in 
support of the insurgency. The underground supporters use ideological propaganda and 
sabotage to eliminate or subvert their governmental opponents. Other resources they 
supply to support the insurrection include intelligence, arms, mobility, and safe zones. 
Fourth, auxiliary support is provided to ensure safe passage and/or refuge for the 
insurgents. They also supply weapons, information, false documents, and financial aid 
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(both legal and illegal) to bolster the uprising. Last, a mass base support develops from a 
sympathetic community and government (Galula, 1964; Marks, 2005; R. Thompson, 
1966).  
The last two phases include both external and internal supports, and may involve 
ethical, economic, political, and sanctuary assistance from foreign states, organizations, 
and individuals. To garner individual support, insurgencies often instill psychological 
fear through intimidation, provocation, and force into the populace’s minds and hearts in 
order to gain support, supplies, and forceful recruitment (Galula, 2006; Kilcullen, 2009; 
Mattis, 2006). Insurgents also use religious and nationalist propaganda to generate 
support. 
Additional factors in this process are the ideological narrative, which must present 
a vision of a constructive socioeconomic/sociopolitical sphere, and other 
environmental/geographic issues (e.g., religion, culture, tribal affiliation, terrain, and 
weather; Kilcullen, 2009; Petraeus et al., 2009). Marks (2005) and Petraeus and Amos 
(2006) noted that phasing and timing were the final general activities of an insurgency. 
These activities are divided into three strategies: (a) defensive (wearing down an 
opponent while creating support for an uprising), (b) stalemate (obvert guerrilla warfare 
as the insurgent group moves become stable), and (c) counteroffensive (where the 
insurrection is stronger and more organized than at the start of the revolt). Here, insurgent 
forces transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare to eliminate government forces. 
Mao Tse-tung (1938, 2007) called these phases a protracted popular war. Insurgency 
does, however, possess weaknesses; these including the need for secrecy, discrepancies in 
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the sequence of events, the need to create base camps, dependence on outside support, the 
need for financial funds, internal separation and task organization, and informants within 
the insurrection (Austin, 2009).  
Counterinsurgency 
 Counterinsurgency occurs in response to the recognized events of the conflict, 
dispute, or insurgency (Galula, 1964). Such response includes the use of strategies 
including diplomacy, peace treaties, or targeted conflict resolution, which aim to end an 
insurgency. Where insurgency aims to create conflict, it should be understood that 
counterinsurgency seeks to establish peace between conflicting parties. 
Counterinsurgency measures often refer to military and political actions by a government 
or an international organization to resolve conflict, but may also involve economic, 
psychological, and civic actions towards resolution (Petraeus & Amos, 2006). 
Roxborough (2007) added that counterinsurgency was the task of suppressing revolution 
and civil war. He noted that military thinkers throughout the 20th century developed 
methods for defeating insurgents, which was the primary aim of counterinsurgency 
theory (Roxborough, 2007, p. 15). Counterinsurgency actions use every available 
apparatus of a national capability to maintain the legitimate government and decrease the 
chances for a further crisis (Galula, 1963, 2006). Kilcullen (2009) further summarized 
counterinsurgency as the competition to win the favor of the population. According to the 
author, local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors are more beneficial to the 
process of counterinsurgency compared with force, even if counterinsurgents usually 
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have more firepower than insurgents. Moreover, Kilcullen (2009) emphasized the need to 
make the population feel secure despite negative insurgent influence (p. 1). 
 Kelman’s (2009) views coincided with Kilcullen (2009) in that current 
counterinsurgency was closer to the population-centric model of the 1950s, which 
focused on protecting and influencing the population and, in attempting to control the 
social aspect of the insurgency, resolve it. Kilcullen (2009, 2010) argued that 
counterinsurgency strategies varied, and no standard set of practices existed because each 
area of operation differed from another. However, Austin (2009) suggested that to be 
successful, the populace must abide by the laws of the authority, and the government 
must eradicate insurgents and address the grievances of the people, while leaving no 
openings for insurgents to use in recruitment and propaganda. Additionally, the 
government must provide security, responsive social services, a stable infrastructure, and 
sociopolitical and economic development (Galula, 1964; R. Thompson, 1966). Equally 
important, counterinsurgency strategies must build strong police and military force to 
secure public trust and confidence. Both the military and civilians must work together to 
win the conflict against an insurgency (Galula, 2006).  
Counterinsurgency has common elements, such as legitimacy, popular support, 
intelligence operations, insurgents’ isolation, security, and long-term commitment to 
rebuilding the host nation. The following discussion explores each of these elements as 
strategic processing tools.  
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Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is the lawful rule of the government through a free political process. 
In other words, a legitimate regime is determined as such by the assent or popular support 
of the population. A government is considered unlawful if it uses coercion and 
insurgency (Austin, 2009). Galula (1964) and Kilcullen (2010) asserted that legitimacy 
was created by strong, just leaders who provided security, personal development, and 
political opportunity, and eradicate corruption. Legitimacy allows authorities to perform 
their duties easily, as well as manage the populace’s interactions and resources and act 
legally on their behalf (Coker, 2012). Ultimately, counterinsurgency is supposed to help 
establish an effective, legitimate government that can address the needs of the masses.  
Public Support 
Gaining the support and consent of the people and encouraging public 
participation are vital elements for counterinsurgency success (Galula, 2006; Hack, 2009; 
R. Thompson, 1966; Tse-tung, 1938). Legitimate governments must also exhibit 
willpower to convince the people that socioeconomic conditions are improving (Austin, 
2009; Galula, 2006; R. Thompson, 1966). Law and order are additionally essential to a 
government’s legitimacy to garner support from the public and purge insurgents (Austin, 
2009; Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010). When a government enters a social contract with 
the people, they must also exercise the rule of law to increase its legitimacy, order, and 
support (Patapan & Sikkenga, 2008; Sadler, 2009). Otherwise, this government will lose 
respect and support from its citizens, and will subsequently fail to fulfill its responsibility 
to the populace as an institution (R. Thompson, 1966). 
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Intelligence Operations 
Intelligence operations refer to actions made by the government to collect 
information on insurgents’ activities and their supporters. Counterinsurgency must have 
dependable measures for obtaining reliable intelligence if it is to be successful (Galula, 
2006; Hughes, 2012; Petraeus & Amos, 2006). This intelligence reveals the movement of 
the insurgents and the populace, as well as their trade dealings, connections, associations, 
and ethnic and tribal grievances (Austin, 2009; Blanken & Overbaugh, 2012; Kilcullen, 
2010). Such information is vital for obtaining and retaining a clear understanding of the 
conditions within the community. Intelligence can be obtained via four major routes: (a) 
reconnaissance, (b) surveillance, (c) human source intelligence, and (d) signals 
intelligence (Blanken & Overbaugh, 2012). Other tools critical to intelligence operations 
include open source intelligence, imagery intelligence, technical intelligence, geospatial 
intelligence, and measurement and signatures intelligence (Austin, 2009).  
Insurgents’ Isolation 
According to Galula (1964), Kilcullen (2010), and Friedman (2011), insurgents 
could only be isolated if they are completely destroyed. Isolation must mean that they are 
physically and psychologically isolated from the population. This process occurs by 
gaining support, addressing needs, and building trust with the populace. The government 
must show that it is capable of victory and is the best available institution for addressing 
issues of public safety and concern (Galula, 1964; Petraeus & Amos, 2006; R. 
Thompson, 1966). Equally, counterinsurgency forces must destroy the forces and 
political structures of insurgents, as well as links with society.  
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Security 
Without security, the elements mentioned above would be useless. Lack of 
security may lead to the populace being threatened by violence; insurgents may also 
provide welfare programs that win them support or undermine the legitimacy of the 
government (Hills, 2012). Consequently, a successful counterinsurgency operation must 
always involve an element of providing security (Kilcullen, 2010; Galula, 1963, 1964). 
Additionally, an insecure environment will bolster insurgents’ claims, spread chaos, and 
hinder reforms (Berdal & Ucko, 2015). Local law enforcement forces, and court systems 
must work together to provide security and criminalize insurgent activities. 
Long-Term Commitment to Rebuilding 
Counterinsurgency operations must demonstrate a long-term commitment to 
rebuilding and maintaining law and order and the overall security of the nation (McLeod, 
2015). Participants of counterinsurgency must be prepared for a protracted fight against 
insurgents. Galula (2006) argued that counterinsurgency forces must be consistently and 
continually visible to reduce physical threats, insecurity, and vulnerability in the 
community from insurgent militias. Likewise, counterinsurgency missions require a 
constant and substantial amount of resources (Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010).  
Counterinsurgency Strategic Processing Tools  
Counterinsurgency strategic processing tools include all of the common elements 
of counterinsurgency as stated above, with the addition of the following three elements: 
the use of kinetic force, the use of non-kinetic force, and conflict resolution. 
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Kinetic Force  
The use of kinetic force refers to the exercise of a power to end inter- or intra-
conflict among conflicting parties, and has been supported by scholars including Levy 
(1998), Machiavelli (as cited in Lynch, 2012), Morgenthau (1948), and Waltz (1959). 
According to Petraeus and Amos (2006) and Kilcullen (2010), using kinetic force aims to 
eliminate insurgents’ networks, potential supports, and cells. Galula (1963, 1964), 
however, argued that the counterinsurgency forces should only use kinetic force 20 
percent of the time to establish security, and should use nonkinetic force the remaining 80 
percent of the time to win popular support. Galula (1963, 1964) warned that using kinetic 
force could lead to failure. Insurgents may then exploit these mistakes to make them 
appear as the saviors of the people. A population-centric approach wins people’s hearts 
and minds, loyalty, trust, and support against insurgents in the conflict and should be one 
of the main strategic tools of counterinsurgency (Mantas, 2013). 
An ineffective but common mistake in the use of kinetic force in 
counterinsurgency is the use of battalion numbers in operations against what appear to be 
only a few visible insurgents; this force is out of proportion with the targeted population. 
For example, military forces often inhabit large and fortified bases for protection rather 
than arrange for units to remain in local communities and protect the population (Galula, 
1964). Further unsuccessful strategies involve the use of allied forces, such as the Special 
Forces or ECOMOG. These groups focus on raiding houses and forgo creating 
relationships with the population.  
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Nonkinetic Force  
The use of nonkinetic force can be traced back to Sun Tzu, who said, “If you 
know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt. If you know 
Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete” (Galvin & Giles, 2003, p. 
53). In addition, Clausewitz (1984) noted that any operation of war is a complement of 
planning, coordination, cooperation, and implementation in the fighting engagement 
against the enemy. These fighting engagements are divided into tactics and strategies to 
win the battle against opponents (Howard, Paret, & Brodie, 1984). Non-kinetic force also 
refers to the exercise of soft power. Soft power can manifest in the form of engaging, 
providing, and addressing the needs of the people to garner support against insurrection. 
This is also known as an idealist or liberalist (as opposed to a realist) position (Beck, 
2006; Easton, 1989; Frederick, 2012).  
Galula (1964; 2006) specified eight strategic processing tools that use non-kinetic 
force for conflict resolution: 
1. At the initial phase of contact in a hostile place, satisfactory 
counterinsurgency forces must secure a perimeter or an area of operation to 
address the insurgency and eliminate any armed groups of insurgents;  
2. Adequate counterinsurgency forces should be relocated in the specified 
location to manage the reemergence of any insurgents and protect the 
populace and legitimate political groups. These forces can also maintain 
contact and participate in public activities;  
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3. The populace and the counterinsurgent forces should constantly communicate. 
Moreover, the forces should control the activities of the populace to cut off 
contact between the populace and the insurgents, while allowing people to 
partake in civic activities (e.g., local politics and infrastructure);  
4. Insurgents’ political operatives should be eliminated and suspected individuals 
with links to insurgent cells should be detained. Doing so will support the 
effort of identifying the influential leaders, while maintaining a degree of 
transparency and safety to/for the public;  
5. Free and fair local provisional elections should be conducted. Later, a national 
election for political participation and representation should be set up; 
6. The abilities of elected officials should be tested with different governmental 
and tangible assignments. Incompetent officials should be replaced, and 
successful officials should be rewarded with assistance for further 
development; 
7. Leaders should be educated. They must also be assembled into a national 
group. Moreover, political regulatory structures should be created to deal with 
remaining insurgents; and  
8. The hearts and minds of the population should be won as a means to exclude 
insurgents from a given community.  
These strategies are vital tools that host nations and counterinsurgency forces must utilize 
to defeat insurgent activities. The applicability of these strategies may differ from one 
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place to another depending on the environment, terrain, people, culture, resources, and 
willingness of authorities to execute them.  
Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution entails a variety of activities/elements, including good 
administration, diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, gaining the favor of the populace, 
peacekeeping, and governmental and local peoples’ participation in counterinsurgency 
operations. Conflict resolution calls on all parties, from the grassroots to national levels, 
to work through negotiation to reach reasonable resolutions that are acceptable by all 
conflicting parties. This approach does not use arbitrary or court results to impose a 
particular course of action. According to Burton (1990) and Fisher (2009), conflict 
resolution requires making decisions that avoid the use of coercion or outside 
intimidation to get to the source of the problem. As such, conflict resolution requires the 
use of neutral third parties, such as professional negotiators, peacekeepers, and peace-
building forces, who convey a unified message to conflicting parties (Burton, 1990; 
Fisher, 2009).  
Conflict resolution has been supported by idealists such as President Wilson, who 
believed in diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation (Bullington, 2008; Throntveit, 2011). 
It has also been supported by socialists like Marx (as cited in Carver, 2009; S. J. Davies, 
2013; Glenn, 2012), who believed that resolution is achieved through equality during 
negotiations, the abolition of class, and external pressure (Burris, 1999; Carver, 2009; S. 
J. Davies, 2013; Glenn, 2012). Contrarily, realists, such as Machiavelli and Morgenthau, 
argued for the use of power, coercion, and pressure (Kapust, 2010; Lynch, 2012). This 
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illustrates the many perspectives in international relations and politics working to address 
the issue of conflict.  
Conflict Resolution, ECOWAS, and Sierra Leone 
In the revised treaty of the July 24, 1993 summit, ECOWAS was mandated to 
employ conflict resolution strategies to maintain security and peace in the region 
(Nwauche, 2011). Article 58(2)(t) of the treaty called upon members to create a regional 
peace and security observation mechanism, and peacekeeping forces where suitable, to 
interfere in conflicts posed a danger to regional stability, such as in Sierra Leone 
(Dumbuya, 2008). ECOWAS primarily utilized the 1978 Protocol of Non-aggression to 
solve member states’ inter- and intra-conflicts. After the Conakry and Abuja summits in 
1997, ECOWAS decided to send peacekeeping forces into Sierra Leone as part of the 
counterinsurgency strategy of conflict resolution. As a result of failed mediation between 
insurgent groups, ECOMOG was mandated to restore the president to power, restore 
peace and security, and integrate internal refugee in the nation. The United Nations 
approved Chapter VIII of its provision to support bloc involvement in Sierra Leone in 
1998. In 1999, ECOWAS further approved a protocol to address conflict resolution, 
management, peacekeeping, and prevention as strategic processing tools for 
counterinsurgency to uphold security, peace, and stability in the subregion (Bamfo, 2013; 
Iwiladel & Agbo, 2012). ECOWAS used conflict resolution strategies including 
diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, power, and peacekeeping to isolate RUF insurgency. 
Popular support endorsed ECOWAS counterinsurgency forces (i.e., ECOMOG) against 
the RUF, though some disagreed with how the forces dealt with the population. 
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ECOMOG was hindered by internal disagreements among member countries (i.e., the 
Anglophone/Francophone problem), late international support, and poor coordination and 
weak forces. However, the legitimate government of Sierra Leone, the African Union, the 
United Nations, the United Kingdom, the United States, and various NGOs collaboration 
with ECOMOG and local forces assisted in defeating the insurgency in 2002 (Bamfo, 
2013; Davies, 2010). Additionally, the population’s participation in elections, 
reconciliation, disarmament, demobilization, reintegrating combatants (e.g., the DDR 
program) and training the new Sierra Leonean armed forces was vital to success. 
Ultimately, ECOWAS invited Sierra Leone and the RUF to negotiate a peace treaty in 
Lome, Togo in 1999. The Lome Peace Accord made RUF leader Foday Sankoh vice 
president and allowed him to control the nation’s diamond mines in return for stopping 
the conflict and deploying the United Nations’ peacekeeping forces to monitor the 
process of disarmament (Davies, 2010). However, the RUF inconsistently enforced the 
peace accord and disarmament processes, and continued attacks on government positions. 
The Guinean and British forces defeated the rebels, and President Kabbah declared that 
the civil conflict had ended (Davies, 2010). 
Figure 1 explains some of the strategies of counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution that can be used to defeat the insurgency. Host nations must win the support of 
the central periphery (i.e., the populace), external support (i.e., allies), and insurgent 
support (i.e., passive and active sympathizers of the insurrection). Conflict resolution 
uses the strategy of negotiation to invite all conflicting parties to a discussion without 
pressure or enforcement of the agreement. Additionally, it encourages all parties to 
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participate voluntarily in negotiation to advance their interests through open dialogue 
with opponents to reach amicable solutions to fix their differences (Burton, 1972; Byrne 
& Senehi, 2009). 
 
Figure 1. Level of popular support for counterinsurgency strategic processing tools used 
in conflict resolution. Explanation of Figure 1 is as follows: “AS: Deter, force, or 
persuade active support via the population. Additionally, deny access to contact, and 
basic needs. In the case of the government it should avoid damage against the public. PS: 
Dissuade, provide security, basic needs, commitment, respect, credibility, and maintain 
legitimacy and ethic. NS: Persuade, provide security, basic needs, commitments, respect, 
build-relations, professionalism, and legitimacy. Anti-insurgency: provide assurances, 
resources, trainings, strong bond, trust, respect, security, finance, and work with HN and 
NGOs. Anti-government: deter and deny insurgents access to all resources. Use 
diplomacy and negotiation to win popular support. Additionally, use force as necessary 
without inflecting damage on the populace. Use persuasions to explain actions taken 
against insurgents. CR SPTs of COIN might be the bridge that links the government and 
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COIN forces to the central periphery of the popular support. Additionally, CR links and 
allows all CPs without inclusion to fully participate in the face to face negotiation process 
to reach an outcome of win-win situation that is acceptable to all CPs with coercion. 
Additionally, CR SPTs of COIN allow the periphery (locals) to participate in the political 
processes to defeat and persuade the insurgents and help establish legitimate government 
and security.” 
Case Study 
Case study research (CSR) is the study of a complex phenomenon (Ketokivi & 
Choi, 2014; Thomas, 2011; Woodside, 2010; Yin, 2013). An oft-cited definition comes 
from Yin (2003), according to whom a case study is “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). Rather than 
focusing on the setting or context of the phenomenon under study, Woodside (2010) 
defined case study research according to the processes that were required of the 
researcher—specifcially, describing, understanding, and predicting the phenomenon. 
Woodside’s definition of CSR is not limited to the phenomenon or real-life contexts. 
Rather, the most important and defining characteristic of CSR is the examination of the 
individual case. CSR is undertaken whenever the researcher wants to focus on context, 
and in doing so hope to shed light on the object being studied (Woodside, 2010; Yin, 
2013). Thomas (2011) defined the two essential elements of CSR as (a) the practical, 
historical unity called the subject; and (b) the analytical or theoretical frame, called the 
object. Subjects can either be a local case of knowledge, a key case, or an outlier case. 
The object is the analytical frame that is used to view the case.  
 Ketokivi and Choi (2014) noted the new popularity of CSR and attempted to 
determine its merits as a scientific method. The authors noted that CSR is usually not 
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seen as a sufficiently rigorous approach compared to other strictly quantitative or 
mathematical methods primarily in terms of three aspects: generality, transparency, and 
cognition. First, the authors noted that case studies, in fact; exhibited the same core 
categories, especially when these properly considered implicit conceptual and theoretical 
dispositions. The authors acknowledged that case studies frequently failed to do this. 
Concerning transparency, the authors noted that objectivity is striven for in research 
because it is never actionable. Finally, they noted that CSR was sometimes susceptible to 
self-fulfilling prophecies if it was not properly formed. However, the authors noted that 
good research required tension between theory and empirical analysis, such that there 
was an opportunity to be surprised by the data, therefore; I did not see only what they 
wanted or expected to see.  
 Overall, the case study method remains useful for understanding the phenomenon 
and their contexts. Although this method has been regarded as lesser than other methods 
(Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2013), it is now rigorously defended as an important and effective 
method of systematic inquiry (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014; Thomas, 2011; Woodside, 2010). 
Summary 
No specific method fits all insurgency or conflict predicaments. However, there 
were special processing tools, such as conflict resolution, that could be used in most 
conflicts. This chapter explored the concepts of conflict, conflict resolution, insurgency, 
and counterinsurgency, as well as common elements counterinsurgency strategic 
processing tools. ECOWAS’s role in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in Sierra 
Leone was then discussed. The literature to date on conflict resolution and 
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counterinsurgency was largely narrative and descriptive; moreover, it focused on 
ECOWAS’s military intervention or political mediation in the subregion rather than other 
strategic processing tools. It did not focus on ECOWAS’s involvement in Sierra Leone, 
though preliminary evidence indicated that conflict resolution positively addressed 
insurgent conflict in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the literature did not deeply explore the 
problems that ECOWAS and its military forces (i.e., ECOMOG) faced prior to and 
during the intervention in Sierra Leone (e.g., issues of manpower, financial and logistical 
resources, or strategic mechanisms of counterinsurgency and conflict resolution). 
Likewise, members’ disagreements concerning how to manage the conflict best have not 
significantly been examined in the literature (Moller, 2009). However, the literature did 
present discussions regarding the implications of counterinsurgency, particularly using 
kinetic force (as opposed to non-kinetic force) to defeat insurgent movements. Thus, it 
provided a basis for future research and policy on counterinsurgency, strategic processing 
tools, and conflict resolution. The next chapter explains the research design and 
methodology of this study, including the sample size; methods of data collection, 
analysis, and management; and ethical issues, including researcher bias, limitations, and 
participant protection. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore the strategic processing tools used by 
ECOWAS as part of its counterinsurgency and conflict resolution efforts intended to 
sustain durable peace in Sierra Leone from 1991-2002. Additionally, I analyzed the 
impact of available resources on ECOMOG’s mission in terms of its success and/or 
failure in the CR process. This chapter includes a description of the research 
methodology; information on the research design, sampling, population, and data 
collection, analysis, and management procedures; a discussion of the study’s limitations, 
and a consideration of the ethical issues involved in this research. In the chapter, I will 
also evaluate my role in handling potential bias and protecting the participants. In 
conducting the study, I sought to answer the following questions: 
RQ1. What were the strategic processing tools ECOWAS employed in 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain durable peace in Sierra 
Leone? 
RQ2. How did these strategic processing tools sustain durable peace in Sierra 
Leone? 
RQ3. What elements, including regional issues, influenced the effectiveness of 
the ECOWAS’s engagement in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in 
Sierra Leone?  
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Research Design and Rationale 
The research method chosen for this study was a qualitative explanatory case 
study. I examined the perspectives of ECOWAS's role in counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution to sustain a peaceful settlement in Sierra Leone. I suggested the qualitative 
method of inquiry for this study to provide a narrative from the viewpoint of the 
participants’ experiences in the conflict (Creswell, 2009; Trochim, 2006). The choice of 
this method of inquiry was in response to the lack of research addressing or explaining 
the emergence of the strategic tools of COIN and CR to sustain a durable peace in the 
Sierra Leone civil war. By using this qualitative explanatory strategy, I sought to reach a 
determination as to whether ECOMOG acted effectively in its goal to bring peace and 
stability to Sierra Leone.  
Trochim (2006) defined research design as an outline that shows how the research 
questions are answered. These answers might be obtained using methods, such as 
interviews, observational field notes, and documents, to collect data and explain human 
phenomena. Having a research design allows the researcher to plan the conduct of the 
research and to ensure that all steps are taken, especially in data collection and analysis, 
are aligned with the study’s framework, underlying philosophy, and purpose (Creswell, 
2009). The overarching aim of this case study was to offer guidance for ECOWAS's 
future conflict resolution missions in the subregion. To realize this objective, I analyzed 
ECOMOG’s assignment in Sierra Leone.  
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Justification of Case Study Over Other Qualitative Designs 
In selecting a research design, I considered numerous qualitative approaches to 
determine a suitable method for this specific study. Qualitative designs are comprised of 
ethnography, biography, narrative, grounded theory, and phenomenology (Creswell, 
2007, 2009). Researchers conducting ethnographic studies explore the cultural manners 
of a group in a natural environment for an extended period to gather data via observation 
and interview methods (Creswell, 2007). This design limits the data collection processes 
to culture (Creswell, 2007; Creswell, 2009). This research was not intended to be a study 
of cultural behavior or merely descriptive of people in the collection data; thus, I 
concluded that an ethnographic design was not pertinent to this study.  
Researchers using a narrative or biography design will concentrate on the study of 
a personal life story, a memoir, diary, or journal (Creswell, 2007; Creswell, 2009). This 
approach was also unsuitable because it would have limited the study’s scope to that of 
an individual's life and experiences. Moreover, it would not have produced the 
information needed to define ECOWAS’s role in counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution in the Sierra Leone conflict. 
A grounded theory design allows researchers to generate a broad, abstract theory 
from studies or dealings grounded in the perspectives of the participants (Creswell, 2007; 
Creswell, 2009). This grounded design uses data created from the research study to 
construct a theory; this emerging theory forms the outcome after comparing similarities 
and differences of information (Creswell, 2009). The grounded theory design does not fit 
the study because this research is not creating a theory but to examine the ECOMOG role 
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in Sierra Leone. The purpose of this research was to explore the counterinsurgency and 
conflict resolution efforts of ECOWAS to sustain peace in the affected regions. 
With this phenomenological design, I focused on a person’s life experiences or 
activities to illustrate a phenomenon. This approach scrupulously selected a small number 
of participants that experienced the event to generate in-common correlations of meaning 
(Creswell, 2007; Creswell, 2009). While compelling, this design was too limited to be 
effective for this study, as it would concern the experiences of only a few individuals who 
were selected by me. In addition, use of a phenomenological design would also have left 
out other vital data (i.e., from the ECOWAS and United Nations) needed to complete the 
study of ECOMOG participation in conflict resolution in the region, especially in Sierra 
Leone (Creswell, 2009). 
Case Study Design 
I determined that the qualitative methodology of a case study design was the most 
appropriate approach for this research. The definitive end of this case study was to offer 
guidance for ECOWAS’s future conflict resolution missions in West Africa. To 
accomplish this objective, I analyzed ECOMOG’s assignment in Sierra Leone. The 
justification for using this approach was based on the rationale discussed in this section. 
Creswell (2007, 2009) and Rudestam and Newton (2007) asserted that assessing 
multiple documents can be facilitated by using a case-study approach, through gathering 
data in-depth and then linking many sources of data. I used this method to compare 
different data. I investigated sources, such as government memoranda, protocol, policy 
documents, and cases written on ECOWAS’s role in conflict resolution in the region. 
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Also, I conducted interviews with participants to collect data from personal narratives, 
court testimonies, and field notes on ECOWAS’s role in this conflict resolution. 
Additionally, I accessed regional groups and government records for data collection and 
analysis. Finally, the topic under study was current and noteworthy, and the people 
conversant about the ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone were alive for first-
hand interviews.  
A case study design permits researcher to undertake a deep study of an event from 
a broader outlook, one that is pertinent to a specific time, occurrences, actions, or the 
people involved (Creswell, 2007; Creswell, 2009). Additionally, it is rich in its flexibility 
and the comparison of documents, and gathers information from assorted resources 
(Creswell, 2007, Creswell, 2009; Rudestam & Newton, 2007; Trochim, 2006). In 
summary, using a case-study research design allowed me to (a) examine comparable 
documents for reliable information and data collection of ECOWAS and the government, 
(b) conduct unstructured observations and interviews with individuals who experienced 
conflict and ECOWAS intervention to gather information, and (c) use libraries and 
United Nations resources for additional data collection on the regional bloc’s 
involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict of 1991-2002. Thus, the most appropriate 
method for this research was the case-study method; this method aided in the exploration 
the extensive sources of data to elucidate the dynamics important to ECOWAS’s 
engagement in the Sierra Leone conflict resolution.  
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Sample and Population 
In the sphere of qualitative research, sampling served as a strategy that referred to 
the selection of units of analysis that array of actors that could provide insights into the 
research problem. Sampling size has no limiting rules in qualitative inquiry (Patton, 
2002). The sample size depends on what the researcher wants to explore as the goal of 
the research study (Creswell, 2014; Flick, 2014; Fowler, 2014). Miles and Huberman 
(1994) and Patton (2002) argued that qualitative research concentrated on in-depth, small 
samples with sufficient information for the research study. I had to select participants 
who could contribute to the study because the goal of the qualitative study was to 
describe, understand, and clarify a human experience (Polkinghome, 2005).  
The result of a qualitative case study design must be comprehensive relative to the 
event investigated in the study. It should not be merely about different groups' anecdotal 
experiences in the population but should factually record the narratives and recollections 
of the event. As a result, the combined use of purposive and snowball sampling 
represents a vital decision process in qualitative research (Creswell, 2009, 2014). 
Purposive sampling strategy relies on the verdict of the researcher when selecting 
the units, such as participants, data, cases, or groups that are relevant to the research. 
Patton (2002) and Tongco (2007) recommended purposive sampling to allow researchers 
to choose participants and/or data that added new information pertinent for the study. 
Using snowball sampling subsequently allowed me to seek more participants to 
contribute to the study through recommendations from interviewed individuals.  
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The targeted sample size was expected to be 10 participants, continuing until data 
saturation was reached. The selection criterion was not based on the representativeness of 
a particular group but the factual experiences of people in the population. Within the 
framework of this research, the focal participants interviewed were Sierra Leoneans. This 
populace was considered because they were knowledgeable of the experience of civil 
conflict and ECOWAS’s role in the nation. The participants were considered as 
individual groups. There were five males and five females’ participants from each group: 
Sierra Leoneans. 
I communicated with prospective participants through telephone calls, personal 
contacts, and letters (including electronic mails). In these communications, I presented 
myself as a researcher, as well as an overview and purpose of the study. The participants 
were assured of their anonymity and confidentiality. It was pointed out to the participants 
that they were chosen because of their expertise and experiences. Moreover, I stated that 
their experiences would lead to a deeper understanding of counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution in Sierra Leone to sustain a peaceful settlement in the area. 
Data Collection 
The data collection strategies utilized in this research study consists of interviews, 
document analysis, and observational field notes. Data collection procedures are 
presented in the section below. 
Interview Resources  
The first data collection procedure was the conduct of semistructured interviews 
with the participants. Qualitative interviewing allowed me to obtain participants’ 
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perceptions of the issue or phenomenon studied and to study the participants’ 
terminologies, opinions, and nonverbal gestures to help understand the complexity of 
their experiences.  
Creswell (2009, 2014) and Patton (2002) maintained that the advantages of 
unstructured or semistructured interviewing were an open-ended approach, which gave 
researchers flexibility, spontaneity, and responsiveness to follow the information in any 
direction that best fit the interviewing participants. At the same time, having a set of 
prepared questions ensured that the most important and pertinent information and 
perceptions were solicited from the participants. The open-ended questions characteristic 
of this approach made the qualitative method different from the quantitative 
methodology; in an interview process, participants were free to use their own words, 
feelings, and experiences.  
Interviews were face-to-face, via telephone, video conference, e-mail, or 
synchronous chat. Performing interviews via phone, email, mail, and chat lessened the 
travel distance and expenditures, and allowed participants to respond at a convenient 
time. However, face-to-face interviews allowed participants to express their feelings 
freely and also allowed interviewers to observe participants’ body language and facial 
expressions. Additionally, conducting an interview face-to-face enabled the creation of 
positive rapport between interviewer and interviewee, as people could talk in detail 
during the interview process. Complex questions and issues were clarified with a few pre-
set questions; in this way, the interviewer was not prejudging what was and was not 
important information. With these advantages of face-to-face interviews, I conducted this 
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type of interviews to collect data. I conducted individual interviews, rather than group 
interviews. Individual face-to-face interviews allowed for in-depth and detailed 
information on the phenomenon being studied. This also lessened the incidence of 
groupthink, which was a characteristic of group interviews (Hall & Rist, 1999).  
In keeping with Creswell (2009), Janesick (2011), and Patton (2002), I developed 
an interview protocol (see Appendix A). Janesick (2011) recommended that researchers 
put their questions to the participant in a comprehensible fashion and ask the crucial 
question first, which paved the way for the other questions, in a systematic manner. Thus, 
I used the guide to ask the participants in a systematic manner.  
The interview protocol included seven open-ended questions. The open-ended 
questions allowed me to reformulate the questions according to the responses of the 
participants. In this way, the questions were participant-driven. The interview lasted 
between 30- to 60-minutes. Participants had the option of stopping the interview or 
leaving at any time. The researcher took notes. Moreover, conversations were audio 
recorded to collect the appropriate information. After the interviews were conducted and 
coded, participants received the transcript of their interviews for checking and revision if 
necessary.  
Interviewees had the option of stopping the interview or leaving at any time. The 
interview questions were the following: 
1. What were some phenomena that influenced ECOWAS leadership to engage 
in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to maintain peaceful settlement in 
Sierra Leone? 
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2. What were some negative factors that pushed ECOWAS to deploy military 
forces (ECOMOG) to the conflicted zone? 
3. What do you like or dislike about ECOWAS/ECOMOG’s role to sustain 
peaceful solutions in Sierra Leone’s civil war? 
4. What are the positive and negative developments ECOMOG brought to the 
conflicted areas? 
5. In a few words, how would you assess the performance of ECOMOG in Sierra 
Leone? 
6. Would you recommend the continuation of the organization? How and what 
would you do or suggest to improve the organization? 
7. Would you like to add anything to the discussion before we end the interview? 
Additionally, would you recommend anybody (or location) who has 
experienced the conflict for an interview visit? 
The interviews occurred in New York, the United States and Freetown, Sierra 
Leone. The locations of interaction with participants in these countries were at a private 
and secure place. Informed consent was obtained, and confidentiality was assured. I 
planned to contact two participants from the Sierra Leone government, ECOWAS, and 
the United Nations, however; the final number was determined later in the research 
process. I solicited information from Sierra Leone government, ECOWAS, and UN 
archives for data collection purposes. Additionally, I gathered information from libraries 
in Sierra Leone and higher institutions of academia for data collection. After the data 
61 
 
collection was completed, I used both manual and computer software to analyze and 
interpret the data.  
Document Resources 
I utilized primary and secondary documents covering the socioeconomic, 
political, and military spheres of the concurrent role of ECOWAS in the civil war. The 
case study approach maintains using accessible data as the most trustworthy and reliable 
sources of information (Creswell 2014, 2009; Singleton & Straits, 2005), especially 
regarding individuals who experienced the conflict but might have forgotten the details of 
the event over time or due to other circumstances beyond their control.  Recorded data 
were helpful when analyzing and interpreting the reflections of the civil conflict in the 
absence of “weak” narratives from people who experienced war. Singleton and Straits 
(2005) asserted data resources should include personal and public documents, journals, 
mass media, nonverbal, and archival resources. Therefore, a case study approach allowed 
me to gather reliable information from the resources noted above for data analysis and 
interpretation of ECOMOG’s role in the civil conflict in Sierra Leone.  
I collected documents from the main library in Freetown, Sierra Leone, 
ECOWAS, UN/NGOs, libraries, and from among many others in the regional bloc who 
use strategic processing tools of counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to 
maintain/keep peace in Sierra Leone. These documents were collated, analyzed, and 
reviewed to determine the role of ECOWAS in sustaining peace in Sierra Leone. These 
documents helped in determining counterinsurgency and conflict resolution strategies 
employed in Sierra Leone. 
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Data Management, Analysis, and Representation  
The strategy for data analysis began with the collection of information that was 
the most appropriate for the research questions and the case study. These strategic 
processes for information collection and gathering included data managing, reading, 
writing, journaling, describing, coding/classifying, analyzing, interpreting, and presenting 
the results (Creswell, 2009). 
In the initial phase, I collected extensive data, which required me to construct a 
data-managing list of all information gathered by the research. I classified information or 
documents into files based on themes that were kept in folders. Additionally, I created 
codes that symbolize the themes for easy access and analysis of data (Creswell, 2009). 
According to Maxwell (2005), coding did not merely involve counting things. Rather, 
coding involved fracturing the data and rearranging these into categories, so that these 
could be compared. Doing so helped in the development of theoretical concepts. Miles 
and Huberman (1994) added that analysis combined both research components: obtaining 
the field notes (either written down or summarized) and the coding of the field-notes to 
analyze these meaningfully. Maintaining the links between these components was a key 
to achieving a responsible analysis. 
In the second phase, I read all data resources collected for the study in full to 
achieve a comprehensive sense of the materials. Creswell (2009, 2014) wrote that this 
strategy of reading and making memoranda was an approach in the qualitative method. In 
the process of reading, writing, and journaling, I also annotated these notes on the 
gathered documents during the preliminary research structure of the journal. These 
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findings were in the form of ideas, core themes, and short sentences that transpired in the 
mind of the reader (Creswell, 2009). 
The third phase involved early codes. The early classifications/codes were 
formulated based on the initial findings of the collected information. I employed a 
constant comparative method, in which the investigator went through the data thoroughly 
to arrive at the insightful meaning of the research. The preliminary codes were organized 
into classifications of similarities and concepts for data analysis and interpretation. The 
classifications or categories were linked to the research questions as a mechanism to 
foster the comprehension of ECOWAS’s role in COIN and CR to maintain peace in the 
Sierra Leone region as a whole. 
I used a combined data analysis strategy of both computer-based techniques and 
manual strategies as a supportive approach of description and interpretation. Patton 
(2002) argued that computer programs were an apparatus that help with this analysis. At 
the same time, the computer allowed me to consider in depth the meanings of the 
information. I created themes and analysis, as well as the ability to display the data for 
classification.  
The manual technique permitted me to hand-code and categorize the interview 
documents personally to create patterns and themes of the study. Additionally, I utilized 
flash drive and CDs as a backup in case the computer failed to perform data analysis 
description (test) and interpretation. Additionally, I used the manual method at the 
beginning of the data assortment process to sketch ideas and sum up information and 
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material resources into vital notes. This method also was used to code the documents 
collected, so that essential information could be used to analyze the data.  
The data analysis tools of computer and manual-based strategies assisted the 
development and comparison of data for subjects, concepts, and triangulation of 
relationships among the collected data. In short, the combined use of computer and 
manual strategies helped to empower the research with factual natural cross-comparison 
and classification of resources and passages for more sophisticated analyses across the 
data compilation. Creswell (2009; 2014) and Patton (2002) wrote that after data analysis 
and interpretation, I should present the outcomes in a scrupulous way that the reader 
could readily understand the material. The last phase involved packaging and presenting 
what was found in the data in the form of a matrix or figure. The presentation of the 
research findings (of ECOWAS’s role in COIN and CR to sustain peace resolution in 
Sierra Leone) was displayed in different forms, such as the table, numeric, or paragraph 
formats for the audience to grasp the essence and meaning of the study. I presented 
research findings in different forms.  
Structure of Narrative Report 
The research exhibited the findings via the practice of the realist approach of a 
case study (Creswell, 2009, 2014). With the realist technique, I presented in-depth 
narratives and explanations of information from participants, documents, and analysis of 
ECOWAS's engagement in COIN and CR to sustain peace in Sierra Leone. I targeted 
various groups, such as Sierra Leoneans, to understand their perspectives on ECOMOG’s 
role in the civil conflict. Therefore, I used the narrative resources of words, visuals, and 
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documents to entice the audiences or readers’ interest as a means of getting vital 
information about the war. Nevertheless, there were no specific set-ups for narrative 
reporting in a case study approach (Creswell, 2009). In any case, I should form a correct 
equilibrium among analysis, background information, conversation, and interpretation 
around 60% to 70% in favor of information. Creswell (2009) maintained that the broad 
objective of the case study strategy was to frame the narrative structure, and I should 
have options to shape the formation of the research. The narrative structure of this study 
guided the aim of the research in offering in-depth analysis and comprehension of the 
regional forces’ role in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to main peace in Sierra 
Leone. At the same, I employed narrative structure to fill the gap and contribute to the 
existing studies that strove to address regional civil conflict in Sierra Leone. 
Issues of Quality and Ethics  
The qualitative method did not possess a solitary specific technique to validate the 
quality of findings and ethical concerns in a research inquiry. Nonetheless, this should 
not be perceived as a weakness in the authentication procedures of the qualitative study. 
Instead, it should be seen as a process of techniques to understand the complexity of 
human phenomena that could not be explained in a quantitative lab. In support of the 
previous argument, Creswell (2009, 2014) asserted that constructing of eminent 
principles in the study of qualitative method might vary from one research approach to 
another, depending on the nature of practices and descriptions. Creswell (2009, 2014) 
further noted that some qualitative researchers attempted to formulate qualitative 
techniques comparable to the quantitative method of validity as a mechanism for 
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recognition of qualitative approaches in the research sphere. Furthermore, a quantitative 
method of validity and reliability concepts would not fit the similar supposition in 
qualitative research. However, the concepts, such as trustworthiness, credibility, and 
authenticity, were more commonly employed than validity and reliability in qualitative 
studies (Creswell, 2009; Patton, 2002). Trochim (2001) argued that validation procedures 
in qualitative findings should be based on the framework of trustworthiness, 
dependability, and credibility. Additionally, there was no inflexibility or fixed 
measurement tool in qualitative validation inquiry. The American Psychological 
Association (APA, 2010) and Creswell (2009) maintained that credibility should reflect 
and explain in detail the worldview of the people that experienced the phenomena (as in 
the case of the conflict in Sierra Leone). Additionally, credit must be given to all 
references utilized in the study. This method would permit other researchers in the field 
to replicate or validate the credibility of the study's findings. Likewise, the tone of 
language used in the study should be equally ethical and respectful across the entire 
research to establish authenticity (Trochim, 2001). 
In this qualitative case study design, I utilized various resources of data, deriving 
an explanation of events, peer-review, and a member-checking authentication of research 
outcomes (APA, 2010; Creswell, 2009). I shared the preliminary results with those who 
were concerned with this investigation for credibility. In addition, I presented an 
exhaustive account of the events under study as a way for others to examine it properly 
and for the feasible application or generalization in other applications. Some experts in 
this domain that entailed academicians, politicians, and individuals who experienced the 
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conflict would review and comment on the findings of the study. The above measures 
were placed to strengthen the credibility, trustworthiness, and authenticity of the study 
(Creswell, 2009). 
I emphasized the importance of the issues of ethics in all aspects of the study (i.e., 
from preliminary data collection, documents, language, analysis, interpretation, and 
presentation). The APA (2010) maintained that a research study must give credit to all 
references cited in the study to avoid ethical issues and strengthen credibility. 
Furthermore, Creswell (2009, 2014) and the APA (2010) suggested that when interacting 
with participants consent must be obtained from them. Likewise, institutional approval 
was required when dealing with minors, victims, or underprivileged persons. I attained 
both consent approval from Walden University and those involved in the research. 
Researcher’s Role 
I undertook the whole study from the joint premises of data anthology, annotation, 
analysis, interpretation, and data description or report of resources. In the summer of 
2014, I visited the capital city of Sierra Leone, Freetown, to collect pertinent data and lay 
down the framework for the research. I directly selected participants suitable for the 
research. At the same time, I attained permission to gather documents and perform 
interviews for the study. Additionally, I utilized letters, emails, and telephone calls to 
contact all those involved in this inquiry. In the research process of the document 
collection and the performance of interviews, I explained the rules of the study to the 
participants. In addition, I used an audio recorder and notes to write the correct 
information collected for better analysis and interpretation. I served as the main tool for 
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data gathering in this qualitative case study. In undertaking this research, I sought the 
approval (number is 12-28-17-0253121) of the Walden University Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) before performing the study. Data analysis and interpretation began from 
when information was gathered until the report is deemed ready (Creswell, 2009). 
Dealing With Researcher Bias and Limitation 
I was the core mechanism for collecting data. The researcher’s first-hand 
experiences placed him or her in close proximity to the information. Dealing with the 
probability of bias was recognized in this study (APA, 2010; Creswell, 2009). Thus, I 
placed some measures to address the ethical issue of bias. First, I preserved a high sense 
of awareness regarding concerns about subjectivity; however, I practiced impartiality in 
the course of the inquiry. Secondly, I uncovered all inconsistencies and dealt with these 
throughout the research process. Thirdly, the research outcomes went through expert 
reviews, peer reviews, and member check techniques to strengthen the trustworthiness, 
credibility, and ethical issues of the study (APA, 2010; Creswell, 2009; Patton, 2002). 
Fourth, I shared the early outcomes of the study with some participants to rectify any 
mistakes in the data. Finally, I used multiple data and documents through analyses and 
interpretations to compare materials to elevate and strengthen the trustworthiness of the 
research findings (Creswell, 2009). The measures described above eradicated any 
researcher bias during the exploration process. 
Understanding the limitations of this study started with recognizing and 
controlling the researcher's subjectivity and bias during collection and interpretation of 
the data (Creswell, 2009; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Patton, 2002). Another 
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potential limitation was that some of the data collection was based on participants' 
decades-old memories. Additionally, access to government and ECOWAS documents 
might be limited to outsiders due to bureaucratic barriers to data. For example, I traveled 
to Sierra Leone in July 2014 to collect materials on ECOWAS’s role in the country's civil 
conflict. The processes of obtaining data were slow and took weeks before access was 
gained due to bureaucratic protocol. Also, documents were not well archived or 
organized because some departments of the government were undergoing transition. 
Most importantly, the unprecedented 2014 outbreak of Ebola created widespread panic 
across the region, forcing authorities to focus more on health issues rather than data 
collection. The above issues confined my timely access to data. However, Creswell 
(2007) and Rudestam and Newton (2007) noted that the case study design was flexible, 
which might allow a researcher to collect different types of data sources for information, 
interpretation, and analysis. The research scope was limited to the role of ECOWAS/ 
ECOMOG in Sierra Leone’s civil war, participants from Sierra Leoneans, the regional 
body, and NGOs that experienced the bloody conflict. With all the obstacles encountered 
in the endeavor, I used documents from the government, NGOs, interviews, and 
observational field-notes as the primary tools to collect sources, analyze, and interpret 
data. 
Participants’ Protection 
The protection of informants was paramount to this research. I selected 
participants based on voluntary consent as a way to maintain their protection. Informants 
received vivid explanations of the procedures and objectives of the study. Additionally, 
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they were given the right of guarantee to withdraw at any time from the study without 
reprisal. In recounting ECOWAS’s engagement in COIN and CR to sustain peace in SL, 
there was the chance that it would trigger horrible reflections of the bloody war crimes 
committed against them. However, I annotated the horrific war flashback to the 
informants before gaining their consent. I acknowledged the sensitive nature of the 
interview, and proceed with caution while questioning to avoid a condition that might 
lead to a psychologically-tainted outcome. Conversely, I made it clear to the participants 
that their identities would always remain confidential and anonymous at all times. Based 
on this situational agreement, I did not use the participants’ identities in the data 
collected, and rather replaced them with characters. The participants’ views/data were 
stored tightly and confidentially. The informants had the full right to dictate the location 
and time of the study. Creswell (2014), Janesick (2011), the APA (2010), and Patton 
(2002) maintained that confidentiality and respect for participants’ privacy and protection 
were vital to control the concerns of ethical and credential issues. Other experts and the 
participants in this field were consulted to review the information noted in the research 
study. 
Summary 
This chapter explored the theoretical research methodologies and designs of 
inquiry for this study. I investigated the ECOWAS's (ECOMOG) role in 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain a durable peace settlement in Sierra 
Leone. There was literature written on ECOWAS's engagement in regional crises. 
Nonetheless, negligible attention was made to the importance of the strategic processing 
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tools of counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to maintain peace in Sierra Leone. As a 
result, I employed a case study approach to explaining the role that the regional bloc 
played to achieve peace and stability in Sierra Leone during the war. I used a qualitative 
research design as the best approach for this research. It provided me with multiple in-
depth sources of information to collect, analyze, and interpret data relevant to the study 
(Creswell, 2009; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). For example, the flexibility of this 
approach permitted me to conduct face-to-face techniques of inquiry/interviews and to 
compare documents, observations, and field-notes for data analysis of the research. This 
same open-ended flexibility of methodology provided me with options, such as direct 
access to data and/or contacts to some participants for interviews and archived 
observation (field notes, etc.) pertaining to the involvement by ECOWAS in the conflict. 
The case study inquiry was conducted in a natural environment to give me unstructured 
options for data collection and analysis. Computer and manual strategies were used as a 
procedural tool to classify, analyze, and interpret data collected on the activities of 
ECOWAS in conflict resolution (Creswell, 2009; Patton, 2002). I employed purposive 
sampling to select around 10 participants based on the criteria pertinent to the study. The 
research data were classified and coded for better patterns, analysis, and interpretation of 
data and the general theme of the study. The research outcomes were verified or 
authenticated via the process of peer review, well deep narrative, and comparison of data 
sources. I assured informants of confidentiality and anonymity pertaining to the 
information they provided during the research inquiry. Their information was paramount 
to the analysis interpretation and comprehension of ECOWAS’s participation in the civil 
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conflict. Chapter 4 will present the data analysis and findings from the responses to the 
research questions of the study.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
The western region of Africa is the continent’s most unstable and prone-to-
conflict region (Aall & Crocker, 2017; Arthur, 2010; Borzel & Hullen, 2015). In the over 
the two decades that ECOWAS has been involved in the regional conflict, researchers 
have discussed the group’s role in peacekeeping and diplomatic relations in the region, 
especially in areas of conflict (Aning & Salihu, 2011; Davies, 2010). However, 
researchers have paid little attention to the importance of strategic processing tools in 
ECOWAS’s involvement in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution. This assessment is 
based on the study’s review of the literature. Therefore, the purpose of this qualitative, 
explanatory case study was to examine the strategic processing tools used as part of 
ECOWAS’s efforts in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain a durable 
peace resolution in Sierra Leone and to determine the elements that led to their 
effectiveness. 
Given the purpose of this study, as well as the history of the Sierra Leone conflict 
and ECOWAS’s involvement in the region, I sought to answer three research questions: 
RQ1. What were the strategic processing tools ECOWAS employed in 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain durable peace in Sierra 
Leone? 
RQ2. How did these strategic processing tools sustain durable peace in Sierra 
Leone? 
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RQ3. What elements, including regional issues, influenced the effectiveness of 
the ECOWAS’s engagement in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in 
Sierra Leone?  
Chapter reviews the context of the study, setting, demographics of the sample, 
documents, interviews, and field notes in this study. Next, data collection procedures, 
including the location, number of participants, and data collection materials, are 
presented, and the data analysis procedure is described. Consequently, evidence of the 
trustworthiness of the data will be given, followed by the qualitative results gleaned from 
the data analysis, including major and minor themes. Finally, the results of the 
subsequent data analysis are summarized.  
Context of the Study 
I used a case-study approach as the most appropriate method to provide in-depth 
contextual perspectives on the study topic. The findings in this chapter consist of the 
analysis of three sets of data: interviews with Sierra Leoneans; documents from 
ECOWAS, the U.N., and scholarly article sources; and field notes. In the summer of 
2014, I visited the capital city of Sierra Leone, Freetown, to collect pertinent data on 
ECOWAS’s role in the country’s conflict and devise the framework for the research. The 
process of obtaining data was slow, taking weeks before access was gained due to 
bureaucratic protocols. Additionally, documents were not well archived or organized 
properly because some departments of the government were undergoing transition. Most 
importantly, the unprecedented 2014 outbreak of Ebola created widespread panic across 
the country and region, forcing authorities to focus more on other administrative matters 
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rather than data collection. These issues limited my timely access to document data. 
However, as Creswell (2007, 2013) and Rudestam and Newton (2007, 2015) noted, the 
case-study design is flexible and allows a researcher to collect different types of data 
sources for information, interpretation, and analysis (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). 
Therefore, I used documents, interviews, and field notes for data analysis and the 
presentation of results. 
Setting 
The interviews occurred in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and New York City, United 
States. My interactions with participants in these countries were at private and secure 
places in order to ensure the safety, security, and confidentiality of the respondents’ 
identities and answers. In recounting ECOWAS’s engagement in COIN and CR to 
sustain peace in Sierra Leone, there was a chance that it would trigger horrible reflections 
of the bloody war crimes committed against them. These memories—or the blocking of 
such memories—could have influenced the responses of the participants (Humper, et al., 
2004). However, I acknowledged the sensitive nature of the interviews and proceeded 
with caution while questioning participants to avoid a psychologically-tainted outcome or 
risk. Moreover, I made clear to the participants that their identities would remain 
confidential and anonymous at all times. Additionally, I used resources from interviews, 
documents, and field notes for data analysis to understand ECOMOG role in Sierra Leone 
civil war.  
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Demographics 
The selected population for this research was a group of people who experienced 
ECOWAS’s role in COIN and CR to sustain a durable peace settlement in Sierra Leone 
civil war. Additionally, these individuals were victims of the bloody conflicts. The study 
refers to victims of conflict as an individual(s) whose basic human rights had been 
violated during a wartime or peace era. I started recruiting suitable candidates for the 
research after attaining IRB approval (see Appendix B). Patton (2002) noted that 
sampling size has no limited rules in qualitative research inquiry. Likewise, Creswell 
(2014), Fowler (2014), and Flick (2014) added that the sample size depends on what the 
researcher wants to explore as the goal of the research study. Therefore, the sample size 
of 10 participants and the selection criteria were not based on the representativeness of a 
particular group but on the factual experiences of people in the population. Within the 
framework of this research, the participants who were interviewed were Sierra Leoneans. 
The study considered this populace because they were knowledgeable of the experience 
of civil conflict and ECOWAS’s role in the nation. The participants were at least 30 years 
old, and they were adults capable of making decisions for themselves. There were five 
males and five females’ participants, and the median age was 40 years.  
Data Collection 
The data collection strategies utilized in this research study consisted of 
interviews, document analysis, and field notes. Data collection procedures are presented 
in this section. I contacted two individuals to help establish links between participants of 
the study and myself. These two persons had no direct roles in the study after contacts 
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were instigated with participants for privacy and safety reasons. Therefore, I was 
primarily responsible for promoting the study purpose to the participants. People 
interested in participating in the study had no direct communication with any persons 
before the interview started. I was directly responsible for recruiting informants, 
distributing research sign up forms, and collecting documents and field notes sources. 
The recruitment process of notifying participants started after the study received IRB 
approval. Creswell (2007, 2013) and Patton (2002) stated that a small number of 
participants might be adequate for qualitative research. Thus, 10 individuals who had met 
the research requirements participated in this study. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the 
participants’ age and gender. 
Table 1 
Research Participants 
Research participants Gender Age 
AJ 1 Male Above 30 years 
SK 2 Male Above 30 years 
OK 3 Male Above 30 years 
MT 4 Male Above 30 years 
DM 5 Male Above 30 years 
FB 6 Female Above 30 years 
AG 7 Female Above 30 years 
MB 8 Female Above 30 years 
HT 9 Female Above 30 years 
SM 10 Female Above 30 years 
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I required that participant age must be 30 years or older before involving in the 
study. Participants’ ages are not shown here for their privacy and protection. However, I 
used above 30 years to indicate that the participants met the research criteria prior to the 
interview process. Creswell (2013) noted that a researcher should be aware that the 
qualitative method involved continuing development. Therefore, early strategy for 
participants’ contributions should not be restricted because changes might occur during 
the study.  Participants were divided into two parts (i.e., five males and five females) to 
strike a balance among their viewpoints about ECOWAS’s role in SL civil war.  
Interviews  
The study examines every single participant and assigned identification numbers 
(i.e., AJ1, SK2, FB6, and HT9) for privacy, safety, and protection purpose. Additionally,  
precise time and day for the interviews (about ECOWAS’s role in Sierra Leone civil 
conflict) were arranged per the participant’s availability as part of the research protocol 
and flexibility to collect data. The drive behind the identification numbers mixed with 
letters had served as the reference point for the informants to evade using their names in 
the interview process and study report. 
I communicated with prospective participants through telephone calls, personal 
contacts, and letters (including electronic mails). In these communications, I presented 
myself as a researcher, as well as an overview and purpose of the study. Data collection 
was primarily through conducting of semistructured interviews with the participants. 
Furthermore, Creswell (2014; 2013) and Patton (2002) maintained that the advantages of 
unstructured or semistructured interviewing were an open-ended approach, which gave 
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researchers flexibility, spontaneity, and responsiveness to follow the information in any 
direction that best fits the interviewing participants. Interviews occurred face-to-face, and 
I conducted interviews on an individual basis. In preserving with Creswell (2009), 
Janesick (2011), and Patton (2002), I developed an interview protocol, which includes 
seven open-ended questions. The open-ended questions allowed me to reformulate the 
questions according to the responses of the participants. In this way, the questions were 
participant-driven. Interviews lasted between 30- to 60-minutes and were audio-recorded 
to collect the appropriate information. After the interviews were conducted and 
transcribed, I gave participants a summarized one-page transcript of their interviews for 
member checking and revision if necessary.  
Documents 
Creswell (2009, 2014), Yin (2013), Maxwell (2013), and Rudestam and Newton 
(2015) asserted that assessing multiple documents could be facilitated by the use of a case 
study approach through gathering data in-depth, and then linking many sources of data. I 
used this method for comparing different data. Also, I examined government memoranda, 
protocol, and policy documents; some cases were written on ECOWAS's role in COIN 
and CR in the region. In other words, the documents employed in this study include the 
Sierra Leone government, ECOWAS, and United Nations sources that an expert 
recommended was the Truth and Reconciliation Court (TRC) of Sierra Leone. 
Furthermore, I used documents of ECOWAS Protocol, Lomé Peace Accord/Agreement 
(LPA), UN human rights report, and other scholarly sources that were written on 
ECOWAS role to sustain a durable peace in the SL civil war. 
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I used primary and secondary documents covering the socioeconomic, political, 
and military spheres of the concurrent role of ECOWAS in the civil war. The case study 
approach maintains the use of accessible data as the most trustworthy and reliable sources 
of information (Creswell, 2014, 2009; Singleton & Straits, 2005; Yen, 2013), especially 
regarding individuals who experienced the conflict but might have forgotten the details of 
the event over time or due to other circumstances beyond their control. Recorded data 
were helpful when analyzing and interpreting the reflections of the civil conflict in the 
absence of “weak” narratives from people who experienced war. Singleton and Straits 
(2005) asserted data resources should include personal and public documents, journals, 
mass media, nonverbal, and archival resources. Therefore, I used a case study approach 
to gather reliable information from the resources noted above for data analysis and 
interpretation of ECOMOG’s role in the civil conflict in Sierra Leone (Yin, 2013).  
I collected documents from the main library in Freetown, Sierra Leone, 
ECOWAS, United Nations, libraries, and from among many others in the regional bloc 
who use strategic processing tools of counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to keep 
peace in Sierra Leone. These documents were gathered, analyzed, and reviewed to 
determine the role of ECOWAS in sustaining peace in Sierra Leone. Moreover, these 
documents of TRC, LPA, ECOWAS Revised protocol 1999, ECOWAS Conflict 
Prevention Framework Regulation, Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance, Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and the Special Court 
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for Sierra Leone had helped in determining the counterinsurgency and conflict resolution 
strategies employed in Sierra Leone. 
Field Notes 
In addition to the interviews and documentary sources, I retained a journal to 
record day-to-day sum-ups of the field notes observations in the course of the study. 
These notes made part of the analyses and findings. Creswell (2013, 2014) recognized 
field notes as a credible source of data. During the study, I witnessed some of the 
physical atmospheres of ECOMOG role in COIN and CR to sustain a durable peace 
settlement in Sierra Leone civil war and wrote down the observations made. Similarly, 
the participants’ demeanor was stated during interviews and transcribed down in a scanty 
form. Subsequently, after the interviews, I transcribed the notes completely, as 
recommended (Creswell, 2013, 2014).  
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Data Sources 
 
  
    
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Multiple data sources of data used to answer the research questions. 
Member Checking  
Once the interviews were performed, audio-recorded, and transcribed, participants 
were given a one-page transcript of their interviews for member checking and reviewing 
the data. I received feedback from all the participants with confirmation of accuracy and 
trustworthiness of the data collected during the interview process. With the informants’ 
verification and authenticity, I commenced the coding process, as recommended 
Interviews 
Data 
Documents 
data 
Field 
Notes 
Data 
The below questions guide this study: 
RQ1. What were the strategic processing tools ECOWAS employed in 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain durable peace in 
Sierra Leone? 
RQ2. How did these strategic processing tools sustain durable peace in 
Sierra Leone? 
RQ3. What elements, including regional issues, influenced the effectiveness 
of the ECOWAS’s engagement in counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution in Sierra Leone?  
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(Creswell, 2013, 2014; Patton, 2002). The coding process divided the data sources into 
themes; classifications; and topical words for analysis, interpretation, and the result 
report. 
Manual Coding 
 Table 2 illustrates the manual coding strategy used to construct themes and 
classifications of data from the research audio and field notes recorded interviews. 
Unstructured or opened coding was an area where themes developed from the raw data, 
and then was later employed into classifications and groups of understanding and 
meaning (Khandkar, 2015). Furthermore, unstructured or open coding might be used to 
decide the itemization of written data and to enumerate the meaning and significance of 
participants’ standpoints on ECOWAS role in COIN and CR in Sierra Leone civil war. 
The interview transcripts, documents, and field notes were examined via detailed 
description, classification/categorical combination, direct interpretation, the creation of 
patterns, and enhancement of realistic generality. Also, the constant comparative method 
was used to code the emerging thoughts. 
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Table 2 
 
Manual Coding: RQ1 Five Themes 
RQ1: 5 Themes emerged Participants’ perceptions 
about ECOWAS/ECOMOG 
Seven interview questions 
that relate to themes/codes 
Popular Support Theme ECOWAS/ECOMOG gains 
public support from local, 
the regional, and the 
international community. 
1 – 10 
Legitimacy Theme ECOMOG attains legitimacy 
from local supports, Sierra 
Leone government, regional 
bloc and UN Security 
Council. 
1 – 9 
Force Theme After gaining popular 
support and legitimacy 
ECOMOG intervened to 
fight RUF and stop the 
bloody war.  
1- 6 
Psychological Theme ECOWAS/ECOMOG used 
psychological methods to 
help with the resolution 
process by defusing the 
situation and giving hope of 
peace to the public. 
1 - 5 
Civic Theme ECOWAS helps to create 
useful political relationships 
and civic engagement i.e., 
the stabilization of society 
and rebuffing negative 
stereotypes. 
1 - 3 
 
Note. Coding Framework: Codes = Characteristics pertinent to each theme. Displays 
ECOWAS relation to the five themes and participants’ response to them. The first and 
second themes show support and authorization, the third theme displays power, the fourth 
deals with people’s mind, and the last one manages civic.  
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Table 3 
 
Manual Coding: RQ2 Three Themes  
RQ2: 3 Themes Participants’ perceptions 
about ECOWAS/ECOMOG 
Seven interview questions 
that relate to theories/codes 
Family/community needs ECOWAS contributes to the 
social and economic needs 
of the Sierra Leone populace 
to secure stability.  
1 - 7 
Identity needs ECOWAS/ECOMOG helps 
instill a sense of recognition 
and acceptance of one’s 
identity, also addressing an 
understanding of others. 
1 - 4 
Security needs ECOMOG provides 
psychological and physical 
on individuals’ sense of 
security and safety. 
1 - 4 
 
Note. RQ2: Table deals with the issues of family/community, identity, and security needs 
of the SL public.  
Table 4 
 
Manual Coding: RQ3 Three Themes 
RQ3: 3Themes Participants’ perceptions 
about ECOWAS/ECOMOG 
Seven interview questions 
that relate to theories/codes 
Fatalities ECOMOG misconduct and 
extra-judicial killings 
against innocent people. 
1 - 9 
Sexual Assault Some ECOMOG forces 
partook in the rape of 
civilian women. 
1 - 7 
Recommendations organizational changes, 
discipline, future endeavors, 
and other. 
1 - 5 
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Note. RQ3: Table deals with the concerns of fatalities, sexual assault, and 
recommendations to address them. 
Table 5 
 
Manual and NVivo Comparison Coding 
RQs 1, 2 & 3 
Themes 
Manual NVivo 
RQ1: Popular 
Support code 
ECOMOG, public, regional, 
societal/community backing, 
welcome, love, die, good work, 
stop 
ECOMOG, local, regional, 
international supports, appreciate, 
like, sacrifice, great job, end 
Legitimacy 
Theme 
Legitimacy, local supports, SL 
government, a regional bloc, UN 
Security Council, COIN/CR, 
willingness, involve, conflict 
Legitimacy, local supports, SL 
government, a regional bloc, UN 
Security Council, rebels, 
commitment, intervention, peace 
Force Theme RUF, bloody, war, hardship, 
horrors, bad, disasters 
ECOMOG, killings, fight, difficult, 
terrible, lootings, sufferings 
Psychological 
Theme 
Destructions, deterrent, public, 
threat, fear, cut hands, aid, peace 
Bombs, atrocity, citizens, harass, 
dread, cut feet, help, hope 
Civic Theme Houses, relationship, military, 
town, negative, engagement, 
stabilization 
Hospital, stakeholders, civilian, 
village, stereotype, society, harmony 
RQ2: 
Family/comm
unity needs 
Hospital, medicines, ECOWAS, 
population, shelters, clothes, 
foods, rehabilitation 
Treatment, injury, organization, 
people, schools, needs, goodwill, 
development  
Identity needs Recognition, negative, relief, 
self, behavior, continue life 
Acceptance, positive, confidence, 
others, habit keep moving  
Security needs Psychological, security, 
Insurgency, individuals, anarchy, 
looting, towns, problem, law 
Physical, safety, rebels, people, 
destroy, robbing, cities, struggle, 
orders 
RQ3: 
Fatalities 
Conventional war, extra-judicial 
killings, SL Army/ECOMOG, 
innocent people, insane 
guerrilla warfare, indiscriminate 
killing, rebels/RUF, innocent 
civilians, crazy 
Sexual 
Assault 
Children, women, rape, 
maiming, Kill, ECOMOG, 
dangerous, underage, take away, 
abuse 
Kids, girls, sex, teenager, death, 
RUF, wicked, young, disappear, 
misuse  
Recommendat
ions 
organizational changes, 
discipline, prepare, decision, 
Fix, professional, military personnel, 
mechanism, regulations, moral 
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laws, attitude, support  standard, teamwork 
 
Note. Shows is the relationship between the manual coding and NVivo Pro 11. Displays 
the comparison between manual and NVivo Coding of themes that emerged during data 
collection and analysis. 
Table 6 
 
Query of Emerging Themes 
RQ1 
Public Support 
RQ2 
Family/Community 
Needs 
RQ3 
Fatalities 
Legitimacy Identity Needs Sexual Assault 
Force 
Psychological Security Needs Recommendations 
Civic 
 
Note. Themes included public support, legitimacy, force, psychological, civic, 
family/community needs, identity needs, security needs, fatalities, sexual assault, and 
recommendations. 
Eleven themes emerged from the raw research data gathering and analysis. Each 
theme had an association with the study’s research questions:  
1. What were the strategic processing tools ECOWAS employed in 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain durable peace in Sierra 
Leone?  
2. How did these strategic processing tools sustain durable peace in Sierra 
Leone?  
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3. What elements, including regional issues, influenced the effectiveness of the 
ECOWAS’s engagement in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution in 
Sierra Leone? 
The field notes comments and recorded audio answers during every participant’s verified 
interview buttressed these emerging themes. I created an order that exemplified the 
operational and written explanations of the study and participant rejoinders authenticating 
the descriptions. These themes were vital apparatuses of ECOWAS role Sierra Leone 
civil conflict.  
Data Analysis 
Data analysis was conducted in phases, using manual documents and NVivo Pro 
11 to store and manage data. These phases included data managing, reading, writing, 
describing, coding/classifying, analyzing, interpreting, and presenting the results 
(Creswell, 2013, 2009). In the initial phase, I read all the data resources collected from 
interviews, documents, and field notes for the study in full to achieve a comprehensive 
sense of the materials. During this phase, I engaged in the process of reading, writing, 
and journaling, thereby annotating these notes on the gathered documents during the 
preliminary research structure of the journal.  
The second phase involves early codes. The early classifications/codes were 
formulated based on the initial findings of the collected information. I employed a 
constant comparative method, in which I went through the data thoroughly to arrive at the 
insightful meaning of the research. I organized the preliminary codes into 
classifications/codes of similarities and themes/concepts for data analysis and 
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interpretation. The classifications or categories were linked to the research questions as a 
mechanism to foster the comprehension of ECOWAS’s role in COIN and CR to sustain a 
durable peace settlement in the Sierra Leone region as a whole. Moreover, I used the 
interview questions and document sources as guideposts for the creation of early codes.  
Results 
 The results of this study are presented in the subsequent section. These findings 
are separated by each research question; within each of these research questions, the 
major themes that emerged are discussed, using responses and quotations from the 10 
participants, as well as document sources, and field notes about the conflict from outside 
sources.  
Research Question 1 
 RQ1 was the following: What were the strategic processing tools ECOWAS 
employed in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain durable peace in Sierra 
Leone? Within the first research questions, five themes emerged: popular support, 
legitimacy, force, psychological, and civic. Each of these themes shows how respondents 
characterized and understood the types of strategic processing tools used by ECOWAS. 
Table 7 demonstrates the response rate and percentage of responses for each of these five 
themes. 
Table 7 
 
Themes for Research Question 1 
 Number of Responses Percentage of Total 
Respondents (n = 10) 
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Popular support 10 100% 
Legitimacy 9 90% 
Force 6 60% 
Psychological 5 50% 
Civic 3 30% 
 
Popular support. The first major and core theme explored how 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG could garner popular support from the regional bloc, the 
international community, local government, and citizens in Sierra Leone (Aning & 
Salihu, 2011; Bamfo, 2013; Berdal, & Ucko, 2015). Galula (2006a), Austin (2009), and 
Kilcullen (2010) conferred that an insurgency conflict was political warfare because the 
objective was the population itself, where maneuvers were calculated to win it over (i.e., 
in insurgents) or to retain it submissive (in the case of counterinsurgents). Additionally, 
they argued that whoever wins the popular support, wins the conflict. Therefore, 
ECOWAS popular support stemmed from ECOWAS Revised Treaty of the 24 July 1993 
Summit (Atuobi, 2011; ECOWAS Commission, 2010) and Human Rights Watch Report 
(1999) supported the organization because of human rights violations.  
Furthermore, ECOWAS Article 58(2)(t) protocol document sought member 
countries to “establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-
keeping forces where appropriate to intervene” (para. 2). Additionally, it urged member 
nations to support ECOMOG mandate and operation in Sierra Leone (Boulden, 2012; 
Dumbuya, 2008; Enuka, 2012). The United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII 
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and VIII considered the predicament in Sierra Leone as a threat to the global peace and 
security for the subregion (Bamfo, 2013; Davies, 2010; Dumbuya, 2008).  
However, such support, while not always absolute, still outweighed any doubts 
about the organization. Indeed, all 10 participants (100%) noted that 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG earned their backing. For some participants, their support was all-
inclusive. As AG7 said, “I thank God for ECOMOG presence in Sierra Leone… I 
appreciated ECOMOG efforts to end the conflict and bring peace to the country.” SK2 
gave the organization glowing reviews. As the participant noted, ECOWAS’s willingness 
to fight and die for Sierra Leone was a large part of their support:  
For me, they did a great job. They sacrificed their lives. To fight these guys, if 
ECOWAS was not there, it would be a big, big disaster… [Their performance] 
was great. The performance was not good it was great. It was excellent. They 
sacrifice a lot and [we] are so in love with these ECOWAS soldiers. 
MT4 similarly argued that support emerged from the organization working to end 
the conflict and help Sierra Leone:  
When they came, they tried their best to make sure they put our war to an end. So, 
we appreciate them so much, and we really thank God this association exists. 
ECOMOG is a very good idea; people bring together to make this kind of 
wonderful organization. Because it's always for all of us benefit. Because 
anywhere [that] has a problem I believe that ECOMOG can do their best to 
restore peace and order there, so let's respect ECOMOG. 
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OK3 agreed, noting that popular support was a function of the organization’s 
selfless efforts:  
I appreciate them. They came into our country [and] most of them never stepped 
foot in our country, because of our war. They find out they should come and 
sacrifice their lives and souls for us. So, I really appreciate that. 
DM5 also concurred, noting, “What I liked [is] the very fact that they were able to come 
to help in Sierra Leone. [That] was very, very, very welcoming.” 
Two other participants rated ECOMOG’s performance highly, which acted as a 
tacit endorsement of support for the organization. HT9 explained,  
The performance of ECOMOG to our country was very good. Their main reason 
in Sierra Leone was to put the war to an end. They tried their level best to see that 
the war was put to an end. We appreciate it a lot. 
SM10 rated the organization’s performance as “very perfect,” adding, “I appreciate them 
for their good work, their good job because they left their countries, they came in Sierra 
Leone to finish the war. So, we thank them for what they did for us.” 
 Finally, two other participants were more conditional in their support of 
ECOMOG. AJ1 described, “I would give them, let's say, in a grade from 1 to 10, I will 
give them eight.” FB6 agreed, noting there were some problems, but that overall, the 
organization did well and was well-received by the citizens of Sierra Leone:  
ECOMOG performed very well, and I recommended them for that. Although not 
everything went perfect, I think the intervention forces did their best. For 
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example, peace was paramount to bring stability to the country, which we are 
enjoying at the moment. 
Attaining the public support, consent of the people, and inspiring public 
involvement are crucial fundamentals for counterinsurgency victory (Galula, 2006; Hack, 
2009; R. Thompson, 1966; Tse-tung, 1938). This was exactly what ECOWAS did base 
on the responses the participants’ provided for the study. This theme stood out as most 
vital among all themes because it linked all of the citizens’ support to end the conflict.  
Legitimacy. The second major theme was legitimacy, which was described by 9 
out of the 10 participants (90%). In this way, participants noted that 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG had legitimacy as an organization (and were able to garner popular 
support) because of two main factors: their willingness to fight on behalf of Sierra Leone 
and their ability to bring peace. Within these two considerations, participants described 
the horrific and appalling circumstances that led to ECOMOG’s commitment. The 
organization’s readiness to intercede on behalf of the citizens of the country who were 
experiencing such hardship afforded ECOWAS/ECOMOG with legitimacy.  
Legitimacy is a political process which permits authorities to execute their duties 
easily, likewise; control the public’s interactions and resources and act lawfully on their 
behalf (Coker, 2012; Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010). ECOWAS Revised Treaty of the 24 
July 1993 Summit (Atuobi, 2011; ECOWAS Commission, 2010), the Sierra Leone 
government invitation of ECOWAS under president Kabbah, the African Union, United 
Kingdom, United States, and United Nations support legalized ECOMOG role in Sierra 
Leone to halt the bloody civil war. Moreover, not only did the intervention afford 
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legitimacy; the success of the counterinsurgency and conflict resolution also acted as 
reinforcement of their legitimacy (ECOWAS Commission, 2008; Frulli, 2000).  
FB6 described the horrors occurring in the country, making the case that the 
intervention by ECOWAS to help stem the tide of these disasters gave the organization 
legitimacy:  
There were too many killings, lootings, children sufferings, abusing women all 
over the country, using a child to fight (rebels) and teaching them how to 
shotguns (weapons), and rape. These were just a few of the bad things that had 
happened during the war, and therefore, ECOWAS [was] deployed its military 
wing (ECOMOG) to stop the war. 
SK2 had a similar response, arguing that the decision by ECOWAS to intervene—given 
the terrible circumstances on the ground—was a conscious and deliberate choice, which 
offered a fortification of their legitimacy:  
They're involved in the war because ECOWAS find out that the war was not 
going to be stopped with these rebels. It was too much killing because there were 
too much killing and no help from the international world. They decide this is an 
Africa problem. They decide to come in and stop the fight. They did not come 
here to decide who to get [inaudible], but they came there to stop the killing. The 
rebels were killing innocent civilians, and the people were flowing to the 
neighboring country. 
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As DM5 explained, both the intervention and the subsequent victory augmented the 
organization’s legitimacy. In this way, ECOWAS’s legitimacy was a function of both 
intentions and outcomes:  
The main phenomena that influenced ECOWAS to send soldiers to Sierra Leone 
to fight, was that they found out that the rebels who were attacking Sierra 
Leoneans, villages, towns, and other places, were very wicked, killing, maiming, 
dismantling women, raping, and all the rest of it. It was established, and 
everybody knew that the Sierra Leone army, who were not used to bush war could 
not fight the rebels. Therefore, they needed professional soldiers, additional 
armed forces to counteract these rebels. The very fact that they were able to come 
to help people who were being threatened by rebels, to sacrifice their lives, so as 
to help drive out the rebels, that was very, very, very positive. 
MT4 similarly argued that ECOMOG’s commitment to Sierra Leone afforded them 
legitimacy, particular given the unfamiliarity of the terrain:  
Some of us were really confused and tormented what to do. But, at the end 
ECOMOG come in, they came and participated with us quickly. Them coming 
here, they are not used to this place, the place is not familiar to them. And they 
could able to put that kind of effort and fight this war to the end. So, I think I 
congratulate them anyway. 
 AG7 likewise explained that this willingness was completed, despite the difficulty 
of the fight, which added to the sincerity of ECOMOG, in addition to their success in 
bringing peace: “I like and welcome ECOMOG’s engagement in Sierra Leone because 
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the government fights against the rebels were not easy. Therefore, ECOMOG’s presence 
brought an end to the civil conflict that had tormented the civil populace.” 
 Two other participants used the word “necessary” to describe not only 
ECOMOG’s involvement but also the decision behind their intervention. This concept of 
need—and the accompanying rescue and relief from that need—was the participants’ 
basis for the organization having legitimacy. HT9 described the following:  
ECOMOG [coming] to Sierra Leone was very necessary. ECOMOG came here 
purposely to finish the war that was destroying many lives of our fellow 
citizens…Their occupation of such places singularly helped because at that 
period; we needed them to help us. We needed them for them to seek refuge in us, 
and then it was very necessary. Their occupation of such places play[ed] a greater 
role because it helps to end the war. 
OK3 agreed, explaining the atrocities that made ECOMOG’s intervention so necessary:  
Where we were having kids that … their hands were cut … small little kids. 
Women were raped. And sometimes, we facing so many "destructions," bombed 
houses down, bombed vehicles. So many properties were lost… And above all 
that, the war got out of hand now. You cannot differentiate between the rebel and 
the civilian, so the war was really terrible. So ECOMOG finds it necessary that 
they should come over to make sure they put an end to a war. Our war to an end, 
because we are part of ECOWAS countries. So, this is one of the most important 
reasons why ECOMOG was in Freetown, Sierra Leone to help us end up our war. 
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A report from Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) agreed 
with participants’ assessments, noting that legitimacy was a function of ECOWAS’s 
willingness to enter the conflict: “In the early years of the conflict, Sierra Leone was 
largely abandoned by the international community. ECOWAS was the only international 
(regional) body that was willing to intervene in the Sierra Leonean conflict” (Humper et 
al., 2004, p. 20). From ECOWAS’ Conflict Prevention Framework, the organization 
similarly defines and defends its legitimacy, taking first a legal approach: “A firm legal 
basis underpins the relationship between ECOWAS, the African Union and the United 
Nations on the cardinal issue of peace and security” (ECOWAS Commission, 2008, para. 
2). However, the next section of the framework frames ECOWAS’ legitimacy in moral 
terms: “Beyond legal instruments and guidelines, however, the unacceptable levels of 
deprivation in West Africa, as well as the destructive nature and spillover effects of 
contemporary regionalized internal upheavals, place-specific moral obligations on the 
ECOWAS Member States to act” (ECOWAS Commission, 2008, para. 2).  
Force. The third major theme that emerged from the first research question was a 
force. The protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security signed in Lomé on 10 December 1999 and using 
force only when necessary to establish security, keep peace, and protect the population 
(ECOWAS Commission, 2008, 2010; Galula, 1964, 2006; Kilcullen, 2010; Mantas, 
2013; Petraeus et al., 2009). 
In this theme, participants noted that the ability of ECOMOG to fight and use 
military power was essential in not only garnering popular support and offering 
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legitimacy to the organization but also in obtaining peace. As AG7 noted, “I welcome[d] 
ECOMOG’s engagement in Sierra Leone because the government fights against the 
rebels was not easy. Therefore, ECOMOG’s presence brought an end to the civil conflict 
that had tormented the civil populace.” SK2 characterized ECOMOG’s use of force as a 
much-needed infusion of power. The participant noted that the more people who could 
fight:  
When these rebels come to this country, the country [did not have] enough 
manpower to fight these rebels. The rest of the countries come together to help 
this country and fight these rebels to bring a peaceful atmosphere for their own 
people…The good thing about ECOWAS is the fight had to establish peace there. 
Peace was the main thing that people of Sierra Leone need.  
DM5 agreed, noting that the country’s own soldiers were ill prepared to fight in this type 
of war; therefore, the competence and expertise of ECOMOG’s soldiers were essential:  
It turned out that the Sierra Leone soldiers who were not used to bush war could 
not fight the soldiers; therefore, many were killed in the battlefront. Therefore, 
ECOMOG/ECOWAS started proper outfitting to send in trained and qualified 
soldiers, professional soldiers to help drive away these rebels who were harassing, 
killing, and maiming the civilian population in Sierra Leone. 
Two other participants specifically used the term “professional” to discuss 
ECOMOG’s soldiers, arguing that their experience, ability, and effectiveness allowed for 
the end to the war. As MT4 said, “They are professionals. And they really know how to 
do their military fight… They really, really try their military bring all their military 
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tactics. To make sure they bring our war to an end.” OK3 agreed, noting, “What they 
have done here, shows us it's clear that they're professional militaries, and they're 
equipped to end any civil war in our region. So, I appreciate that.” Finally, while HT9 did 
not specifically label ECOMOG as professionals, the participant described using their 
force as precise, practiced, and skilled, thereby aiding in hastening the end of the war: 
The ECOMOG were sent and then distributed in different locations because the 
war extended to another level. We are in the killing of people, burning of the 
house, rapping of children. We are very disturbing. Then the ECOWAS stopped 
[inaudible], sending ECOMOG and distributing them to different parts of our 
country and different districts like Bo, Kenema, or Kono was very necessary 
because by then, the war was severely disturbed and then it moved to another 
level…Their occupation of such places singularly helped because at that period; 
we needed them to help us. We needed them for them to seek refuge in us, and 
then it was very necessary. Their occupation of such places play [ed] a greater 
role because it helps to end the war. 
While the Report of Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
agreed with participants as far as they noted, “ECOMOG was the surrogate national 
Army in all but name,” and “Regional intervention came from the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS),” the report did not consider the forces valuable, 
adding that ECOMOG’s “defence of strategic areas would prove disgracefully weak” 
(para. 2). In this way, there was a contradiction between the perceptions of the 
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participants and the post-mortem report on ECOWAS/ECOMOG (Human Rights Watch 
Report, 1999; Humper et al., 2004). 
Psychological. The fourth theme to come from the first research question was 
psychological, which explored how ECOWAS/ECOMOG employed psychological tools 
to help with the resolution process. Galula (1964, 2006), Kilcullen (2010), Mantas 
(2013), and Petraeus et al. (2009) argued that the psychological warfare of winning the 
hearts and minds of the populations was an important approach to win a war against 
insurgency in the COIN and CR strategies. ECOMOG used this psychological tactic in 
different ways in Sierra Leone to win the public support and pave the ways for 
sustainable peace in the country.  
However, these methods were explained differently by each participant. For AJ1, 
the intervention of ECOMOG acted as a deterrent, inspiring concern and thereby 
lessening the number of rebels that were willing to fight:  
I like it because at least it scared some people off, just like recently the impasse in 
the Gambia. As we know, when ECOMOG involved, Jammeh was scared he 
doesn't have the army to support him to go against a mighty power like 
ECOMOG. 
For other participants, the psychological components of ECOMOG were related 
to the impact on the citizens of Sierra Leone. Three described the psychological element 
of ECOMOG as the negation or at least diminishment of the psychological warfare that 
the atrocities wrought against them had brought. MB8 described this as a sense of 
security and safety that this would not happen again: “That's why ECOWAS [was] 
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involved so they can help us in trying to make sure this never happens anymore. Because 
it's not fair to come and rape innocent children, you know, trying to take them from their 
country.” MT4 noted that ECOMOG was essential because “our war is one of the critical 
wars in history,” and their presence allowed the participant to believe the organization 
was “really do[ing] their own best to resolve our war situation here.” OK3 described the 
impact of ECOMOG as fighting against the fear, dread, and threat of the rebels:  
The rebels were doing very wicked things to our people, especially the women. 
Because they raped them, and they abused them, and they stole properties. They 
above all, they cut hands, cut feet. They threatened us there and took away our 
properties. 
Finally, FB6 described this element included a sense of relief and routine for people, 
allowing them to feel as though life was returning to normal: “At the end of the day 
people were able to return to their normal lives, schools re-open, and lives went to 
normalcy in the country.” 
Civic. The final theme in the first research question was civic tools, which was 
cited by three (30%) of the participants. Teamwork between civilians, local government, 
and the intervening forces were crucial for COIN and CR victory against the insurgency 
and maintain peace in host nation (Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010; Mantas, 2013; Petraeus 
et al., 2009). Within this theme, participants considered how ECOWAS helped to create 
productive political and civil relationships in the country. For FB6 civic engagement 
included the stabilization of society, rebuffing negative stereotypes, and hardened social 
lines: “If you see people currently living in harmony it’s due to the peace the intervention 
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forces brought in the country.” HT9 explained that not only was the stabilization of Sierra 
Leone important, the political implications and reverberations were also important. The 
participant explained the following: 
Their purpose of coming to Sierra Leone during the wartime was very necessary 
and very important because they played a greater role. They helped to finish the 
war that was severely unacceptable so that it wouldn't be extended to our 
neighboring countries. This war was first of all in Liberia. From Liberia, it 
extended to Sierra Leone, and then if it were extended to another neighboring 
country, it would have been something very dangerous that will lead to more 
deaths of our citizens and citizens from another country. 
 Conversely, SK2 described the way that ECOWAS out warded employed civic 
engagement, particularly within their organization. The participant contended that the 
chairman of the ECOWAS could build productive political relationships, thereby getting 
the money needed to send ECOMOG into Sierra Leone. SK2 described the following:  
It was total anarchy in Sierra Leone at that time. ECOWAS played a great role. 
They spent a lot of money. Abacha [the chairman of ECOWAS] was the man; he 
did it. If it wasn't Abacha, the problem of ECOWAS I don't think it will ever [be] 
solve[d]. There were too many games in ECOWAS. ECOWAS leaders lay back, 
they don't want to spend money, and they don't want to send the people. Because 
of Abacha was interested in Sierra Leone and he was a friend of the former 
President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, he was able to spend more money on ECOWAS 
and ECOWAS played a great role...  
103 
 
Moreover, SK2 explained how these productive political relationships were not just 
within ECOWAS, but also within ECOWAS member nations. The participant noted the 
following: 
At that time, ECOWAS was not financially equipped to fight in Sierra Leone. He 
was the one who [inaudible]. Matter of fact, during that time it's only Nigerian 
and Guinean contingents in ECOWAS were fighting in Sierra Leone. Only these 
two countries were fighting the rebels and the rest of the countries not yet come. It 
was later on you find out the rest of the countries started sending forces to Sierra 
Leone. 
Documents from the TRC also cited ECOMOG’s role in civic life during and 
after the conflict. According to the commission, the ECOMOG primary acted as an arm 
of the government:  
[ECOMOG] increasingly came to play the role of the government’s defense force. It took 
instructions; and directions from the executive of the Sierra Leone Government and some 
of its military officers issued orders and commands on behalf of the Government. (para. 
2) 
Yet, a report by Human Rights Watch characterizes ECOWAS as integral in 
providing a link between political players: “ECOWAS has played an important role in 
facilitating peace negotiations between the RUF leaders and representatives of the 
government of President Kabbah, which took place in Togo, whose president is the 
current chair of ECOWAS” (para. 2). Similarly, a report by the United Nations noted, 
“ECOWAS efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Liberia included the mediation of a 
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series of agreements which became the basis for the peace plan of November 1990, 
including the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU)” (para. 
2). 
Moreover, ECOWAS themselves, in their Conflict Prevention Framework (2008) 
noted that their objective was to achieve democracy and political governance, listing 16 
activities the organization undertakes to achieve these ends, including “strengthening of 
the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary of Member States,” “to promote the 
professionalization of governance institutions by building and strengthening transparent, 
nonpartisan, efficient and accountable national and local institutions,” and offering 
“assist[ance] for political parties with financial resources and know-how to strengthen 
internal party democracy and participation.” These assessments complicate the idea of 
how ECOMOG’s presence affected political relationships and the perceptions of those 
relationships between stakeholders.  
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 was the following: How did these strategic processing tools 
sustain durable peace in Sierra Leone? Within this second research question, there were 
three major themes: family/community needs, identify needs, and security needs. Each of 
these themes contributed to the legitimacy, as well as popular support, of 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG. Table 8 demonstrates the responses to the themes for this 
question. 
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Table 8 
 
Themes for Research Question 2 
 Number of Respondents Percentage of Total 
Respondents (n = 10) 
Family/Community Needs 7 70% 
Identity Needs 4 40% 
Security Needs 4 40% 
 
Family/community needs. The first theme from the second research question 
was family/community needs, which was cited by 7 of the 10 participants (70%). Within 
this theme, participants discussed how ECOWAS contributed to the material and 
economic needs of the people of Sierra Leone, which helped secure stability and goodwill 
towards the organization. As AG7 said, “I appreciated ECOWAS’s role in Sierra Leone 
because the organization provided clothes, foods, medicines, and shelters to the 
population.” HT9 concurred, emphasizing the range of needs ECOWAS served, as well 
as the importance of addressing those needs:  
The positive development that ECOWAS brought to Sierra Leone, the ECOMOG 
came with medicines, [inaudible], some other materials to donate to our peoples 
in this country. Then they helped to rehabilitate some schools, hospitals, morgues 
and worship places. Everyone rehabilitated to one hospital that was [inaudible]. 
By then, I was staying there. Up until now, the hospital is still in use. People are 
surviving still at that very hospital. The medicines that they brought to Sierra 
Leone really help us, because by then we have many injured peoples, many sick 
people that needed help. 
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MT4 concurred, particularly emphasizing the importance of the medical benefits 
provided: “The development part they bring, one is the aid they were doing [to] help us, 
medicines used… They came with drugs, medicines for our children, hospitals et cetera.” 
OK3 emphasized not only the addressing of medicinal community needs but also the 
need for shelter. As they described: 
They brought us some fuel, some clothes, used clothes. They helped people that 
lost their homes. They shelter them. And the doctors, they brought many care 
facilities. All this, they are positive facts…At the same time, some of them, when 
they came over here, they bring us hospitality for our people that were affected by 
the war. And they do so many things that you name them.  
Similarly, MB8 focused on the help their community received with shelter, in addition to 
other community needs:  
They built Bafa [a house made of zinc]; also, they brought things like ammunition 
and food. They brought money. They have people to build their house. They have 
the [inaudible] to make sure people have food, medication, and treatment. 
Finally, SM10 described the importance of addressing shelter for the community, 
particularly in the wake of the destruction wrought by the rebels:  
The performance ECOMOG was doing in Sierra Leone was good. They were 
helping people, giving shelter to people, if they don't have houses. The rebels 
bombed some houses, some people's houses, they were building houses, building 
huts for people, saving people. If they hear that rebels are over there, the 
ECOMOG will go there, fight, to pull out the people there. 
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Such perceptions were aligned with the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention 
Framework (2008), TRC of Sierra Leone report (2004), ECOWAS revised protocol 
(2010), the Lomé peace agreement (1999), and the UN Human Rights Watch Report 
(1999), which state, in part, that the goal was to provide and “include, but not limited to, 
humanitarian assistance, restoration, and maintenance of economic and social 
infrastructure.” 
Identity needs. The second theme from the second research question was identity 
needs, which considered how ECOWAS/ECOMOG helped instill a sense of recognition 
and acceptance of one’s identity and dignity, while also addressing an understanding of 
others. The political identity of recognizing individuals and solving their needs was a 
powerful tool in COIN and CR strategies to gain public support over the insurgency 
propaganda (Doucey, 2011; ECOWAS Commission, 2010; Galula, 2006a). However, 4 
of the 10 participants (40%) cited this theme. For MB8, the most significant aspect of this 
aspect was a sense of relief and concomitant confidence. As the participant noted, 
ECOWAS was essential in helping citizens feel that:  
I finally have peace of mind. I finally have people coming to help me. So, they 
bring a kind of, good stuff, stuff that changes the negative already made, so 
people can continue with their lives and keep on moving. In a positive way, [they] 
want them to help more and more people and make them feel confident in their 
own country and their own thing.  
Other participants explained that ECOWAS/ECOMOG helped expose them to 
different ideas and concepts of self and others. As MT4 said, “They're coming to our 
108 
 
country br[ought] so much understanding to change some of our attitudes from negative 
to positive. Because of the war, most of us learned so many lessons.” OK3 agreed, noting 
that not only did the organization bring about a sense of unified national identity, but it 
also helps reveal a sense of civility and progress:  
The positive development they brought in our country here, is that most of us, we 
never know about war. And we, some of our people in the province, never 
stepped their foot in the city. And they have never been out of our nation. But 
when the ECOMOG came, it brought some kinds of civilization in our people's 
face. 
Finally, SM10 explained that not only did ECOMOG work to not “expose us” and the 
lack of “good behavior” that some citizens had. But the participant argued that 
ECOMOG’s intervention actually worked to help cultivate better qualities in the people’s 
attitudes: “Some of us don't have good behavior, so they try to change it and put good 
habits in us.” 
 According to a Human Rights Watch (1999) Report, ECOMOG added to identity 
needs by working to reintegrate soldiers from the war. As the report states, “ECOMOG's 
mandate also includes the implementation of a program for the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (the DDR program), and training the 
new Sierra Leone army” (Davies, 2013; ECOWAS Commission, 2010; Glenn, 2012). In 
this way, there was an attempt to unify the Sierra Leone identity, particularly those who 
fought in the conflict. ECOWAS (2008) described the role as, in part, helping to 
reconcile the multiplicities of identities, as well as the conflict those identities may evoke, 
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arguing that they should conduct “Capacity-building workshops and seminars on 
mediation and alternative dispute resolution for local peace constituencies, particularly 
traditional rulers, religious leaders, women groups, youth groups and other civil society 
organizations,” as well as “financial and technical support” for disputes based on 
“ethnicity, religion, gender, and youth” (para. 2). 
Security needs. The final theme for the second research question, cited by 4 of 
the 10 participants (40%) was security needs. ECOWAS (2008), TRC of Sierra Leone 
Report (2004), ECOWAS (2010) revised protocol, the Lomé (1999) peace agreement, 
and the UN Security Council under Chapter VII and VIII supported ECOMOG to address 
and provide security needs for Sierra Leone populace. In this theme, participants 
discussed the psychological and physical impact ECOMOG had on individuals’ sense of 
security and safety. AJ1 explained the following:  
Because at least ECOMOG stabl[ized] the country from the rural area to the 
capital city, there was no government. No functional government. Actually, the 
president was actually removed from the country, and he was based in 
neighboring Guinea… Insurgency and rebels were like everywhere. There were 
popping up from everywhere, looting and robbing peoples. But they knew that if 
they [inaudible] an ECOMOG come with their power, they will kick them out.  
DM5 explained the sense of safety as coming from ECOMOG’s ability to “help in 
their own diverse way to protect some towns and cities.” One of these ways, according to 
DM5, was by the physical construction of infrastructure: “They also build some 
infrastructures around the country to help the military.” HT9 simply noted that security 
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came from ECOWAS “saving many innocent lives.” Finally, SK2 noted that the safety 
and security offered by ECOWAS were essential, even if there were some problems with 
the organization. As the participant explained,  
When ECOWAS came in Sierra Leone, it's like when the rain is coming in a hot 
summer. You've been struggling for long; then the rain comes, you gonna be so 
happy. Even if the rain comes, even if it destroys some of the plantations, but at 
least you were able to survive. You were able to survive and get some food to eat. 
That's how ECOWAS was. 
More than just the security of knowing where one’s next meal would come from, SK2 
argued that this sense of safety came from ECOWAS ability to “establish law and order.” 
The participant described the following: 
This ECOWAS intervention was what we needed at that moment. People were 
just down without nobody coming from nowhere to help them. We got it going, 
and the RUF took advantage of our people. When ECOWAS came, it was able to 
establish and push the military government out power, because the country was in 
total anarchy. You don't know where to go, you don't know where is safe. When 
ECOWAS took over, it was able to fight the rebels and push them out of the city 
and push them far away from the country. ECOWAS involvement was the best 
thing at the time that the people loved. People were able to get themselves 
together. 
These perceptions similarly seemed to align with the ECOWAS (2008) conflict 
prevention framework, which noted its objectives were, in part, the “restoration and 
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reform of governance institutions (political, economic, socio-cultural and security); 
justice, rule of law, reconciliation and reintegration; and conflict-sensitive development” 
(para. 2). However, such accounts from the participants seemed in conflict with the TRC 
documents (Hamper et al., 2004), which pointed to the psychological (and physical) 
terror that the forces imposed, particularly on women: 
Women and girls became the targets in the brutal conflict in Sierra Leone. They 
suffered abduction and brutality at the hands of their perpetrators. Their 
vulnerability was deliberately exploited in order to dehumanize them.  
Research Question 3 
RQ3 was the following: What elements, including regional issues, influenced the 
effectiveness of the ECOWAS’s engagement in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution 
in Sierra Leone? The third research question had three themes, all of which addressed the 
challenges—and possible solutions—for and of ECOWAS. The first two themes—sexual 
assault and fatalities—were significant problems that came with ECOWAS/ECOMOG’s 
intervention. The final theme–recommendations—proposed ways that ECOWAS could 
change to help overcome certain obstacles. Table 9 demonstrates the responses to these 
themes, as well as any subthemes. 
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Table 9 
 
Themes for Research Question 3 
 Subtheme Number of 
Respondents 
Percentage of Total 
Respondents 
Fatalities  9 90% 
Sexual Assault  7 70% 
Recommendations    
 Organizational 
Changes 
5 50% 
 Discipline 3 30% 
 Future 
Endeavors 
3 30% 
 Other 2 20% 
 
Fatalities. The first theme to emerge from the final research question was 
fatalities. Burton (1990) and Fisher (2009) admonished that conflict resolution 
necessitates creating decisions that circumvent using force or external extortion to get to 
the cause of the issue. Also, COIN and CR forces should do their best to avoid and curtail 
fatalities among the civilian populations. Additionally, unnecessary killings and violence 
of innocent people might lessen public support, legitimacy, and trust for the intervening 
forces (e.g., ECOWAS Commission, 2010; Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010; Mantas, 2013; 
Petraeus et al., 2009). However, 90% of participants noted that the effectiveness of 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG, including their claims to legitimacy and popular support, were 
tampered if not badly damaged by what AG7 characterized as “misconduct against 
innocent people,” including extra-judicial killings. AJ1 described this horrific problem as 
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a function, in part, of unconventional warfare, with which ECOMOG was not familiar or 
ready:  
Government forces cannot identify civilians from rebels because, as you know, 
there were civilians and there was no government army. SLA Army (Sierra Leone 
Army) broke up, and they joined with the rebels, and you can't tell who is a rebel 
and who is a soldier… Because ECOMOG actually fights a conventional war, but 
it doesn't know how to fight guerrilla warfare, because guerrilla warfare and a 
conventional war are totally different. Therefore, ECOMOG sometimes uses a 
plane to bomb rebels, and civilians could lose their lives during the fight, so; the 
collateral damage is insane. And the extra-judicial killings were ridiculous 
because the ECOMOG soldier would arrest somebody, it would be the judge, 
jury, and executioner at the same time, that's crazy.  
DM5 similarly pointed to ECOWAS/ECOMOG’s involvement “in killing 
innocent civilians who were labeled as collaborators,” while FB6 echoed the sentiment of 
the organization taking on the power of life and death: “Some of the things that I dislike 
about ECOMOG operations were the extrajudicial killings of innocent people 
indiscriminately without trials.” As FB6, such fatalities had wider implications, 
particularly economic ones for the remaining families:  
As a result, people lost breadwinners of their families (by both ECOMOG and the 
rebels) in the civil war…The intervention forces were killing innocent civilians 
with no investigation into allegations. As noted previously some of the people 
killed indiscriminately were the main providers for their families.  
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Some participants reiterated the killing of innocent people. HT9 said, “The other thing I 
dislike about them, ECOMOG killed innocent souls that were not rebels,” including a 
colleague’s daughter who “ECOWAS mistakenly killed because they thought she was 
part of the rebels.” 
Two other participants also had first-hand knowledge of people who were 
wrongly killed by ECOMOG. SK2 called the killing “random,” saying ECOWAS was 
killing both civilians and non-civilians:  
In the end, one of my best friends, may his soul rest in peace, was caught by 
ECOWAS. They want to kill him. They say he's a rebel. The thing I don't like 
about it, they'd not check you, they just kill. That's what I didn't like about the 
ECOWAS intervention. They don't discriminate. They don't find out whether you 
are a rebel or soldier or you're not a civilian. When you come to ECOWAS forces 
for rescue, they kill you. You know? 
Moreover, SK2 attributes random killing to the choice of weaponry by ECOWAS:  
When this ECOWAS was capturing these cities, you've got a lot of innocent life 
was gone. This air fight jet was coming from nowhere, killing people randomly… 
Using more artillery, you kill more innocent people without choosing where is the 
rebels at or where is not the rebels. 
SM10 also told a personal story about the slaying of innocent civilians:  
I don't like ECOMOG because of what they did, because they were killing some 
innocent people. If they come to this area, they will ask people, do you know 
these people. If we say no, we don't know them, they will kill them. One of my 
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first cousin's husband, they kill him because of the place they met, the man, they 
ask people, do you know this person? If they say that no, we don't know this 
person they will kill him/her. 
Finally, OK3 gave an explanation—though not a justification—for these indiscriminate 
killings, arguing that ECOWAS was scared. Like the previous participants, OK3 had 
close family members who were victims of this fear: 
Some of them were killing innocent civilians that are not even involved in the 
war, just because they were scared of all Sierra Leoneans. Some Sierra Leoneans 
were rebels. So, they were not able to identify rebels and civilians at the same 
time. Some of our important brothers and sisters - family members - they lost 
their lives through that process. 
The report from TRC (2004; documents of Sierra Leone government, ECOWAS 
bloc, and the United Nations) collaborated the descriptions from the participants. The 
commission noted the following: 
Some ECOMOG soldiers engaged in human rights violations during the defense 
of the city. The Commission finds that ECOMOG soldiers committed summary 
executions of civilians, mostly in Freetown, while repelling the invasion of 
January 1999. These executions were directed largely at persons accused of being 
“collaborators.” 
Sexual assault. In addition to the indiscriminate killing of innocents, 7 out of 10 
participants (70%) contended the ECOMOG participated in the rape of civilian women. 
AG7 described the sexual assault of girls, not even women: “Some of its forces had 
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followed 12- and 13-years old girls as sex partners, used black magic on our sisters, 
invaginated underage girls because of their military positions.” DM5 placed the age range 
only a little higher, also saying that those young girls subsequently disappeared: 
“ECOMOG soldiers too, when they came, they were going to bed with 14, 15, 16-year-
old girls. And even when the forces went away, they took some of the girls with them—
some parents don't know up to date their daughters’ whereabouts.” HT9 similarly argued 
that many of these young women were taken away: “When the war was put to an end, 
they took away our sisters to their own country. They used and abused them.” AJ1 
agreed, accusing ECOMOG of “raping young women” and noting that because of that, 
the “abortion rate was high when ECOMOG was in Sierra Leone.” For those who did not 
have an abortion, FB6 noted that they were left on their own: 
ECOMOG forces impregnated teenage girls, many children went astray, took 
advantage of or prey over innocent women who knew little about ECOMOG. As a 
result, before ECOMOG departed the country, they left many pregnant women 
with children without fathers and supports. 
MT4 echoed this sentiment, noting that the forces had “interrelationship with our sisters, 
which they took away and we never know their destinations up to now. So, some of them 
get our daughters here pregnant and leave them and go without no coming back.” 
Additionally, while MB8 distinguished between the good and bad forces, saying “some 
of them rape[d] people. Not all of them,” the participant still condemned the sexual 
exploitation of women in need: “[They] rape[d] innocent people that were crying, they 
117 
 
need[ed] help. They raped them; they misused them; they mistreated them badly and stole 
from them.”  
However, despite these two atrocities committed by ECOMOG forces, overall, 
participants still believed the organization had both legitimacy and popular support. The 
interviewees or participants’ views about atrocity, rape, killing, and property destructions 
were all supported by the findings of the TRC (Humper et al., 2004) of the rebels and 
Sierra Leone army characters and behaviors against the population. As the TRC (2004) 
noted, “Women and girls were raped, forced into sexual slavery and endured other acts of 
sexual violence, including mutilations, torture and a host of other cruel and inhumane 
treatment” (para. 2). The ECOWAS (2008) Revised Treaty the Lomé Peace Accord, and 
the Human Rights Watch (1999) stressed to solve the issue noted previously among all 
those involved in the civil war. 
Recommendations. The final theme was recommendations, in which participants 
advised how to change and fix aspects of ECOWAS/ECOMOG. Within this theme, there 
were four subthemes: organizational changes, discipline, future endeavors, and among 
others. The first subtheme, cited by five individuals, was organizational changes that can 
be made to ECOWAS. For DM5, these changes should be about member requirements, 
as well as enforcement of organizational decisions. First, DM5, noted, “Member states 
must be prepared at all times, one, to pay their financial contributions, two, to provide 
military personnel when necessary.” At the same time, DM5 contended, “ECOMOG 
should find a way to enforce their rules and regulations as long as member states have 
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signed the protocol, they should be bounded to obey it.” The participant noted that this 
would provide further legitimacy to the organization, and provided a specific example:  
ECOWAS Court has just decided a case between the former Vice-President of 
Sierra Leone and the government of Sierra Leone. That case, in Sierra Leone, it 
didn't go well. So, the former Vice-President had to carry the case to the 
ECOWAS Court, and they have now ruled in his favor. But the implementation of 
that ruling has yet to happen. So, they should put a mechanism in place wherein 
member states must be bounded by all regulations as long as you are part of ... 
you have signed the protocol. You should obey what a course court has said.  
AG7 suggested membership-based changes; primarily, AG7 noted that there 
needed to be an expansion of membership to help protect the interests of nations:  
My advice for countries that are not part of the organization to become a member 
of it, because no one knows what might happen in the future (i.e., civil war, 
military coup, and etc.), which might need ECOWAS’s assistance to end the 
matters. 
In a similar vein, FB6 argued that there needs to be “teamwork and support” 
between the countries and ECOWAS, saying that such changes were “necessary for the 
organization’s development for future prospectus or mission.” Finally, SK2 also 
considered the future of the organization, mainly arguing that “they need money.” The 
participant explained the following: 
When they get money, this organization is going to be improved. When they've 
got money, this subregion is going to establish a good government system that 
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will have their own cities in their own country. You can go to all these West 
African streets and be peaceful. If they got the money, they would provide 
security and peace everywhere. I'm recommending if ECOWAS could get more 
money to finance its operations, it will be good for ECOWAS. 
In addition to organizational changes, even ones that implicitly discussed 
recommendations pertaining to future endeavors, three participants superficially spoke to 
the need for ECOWAS to focus on potential or upcoming conflicts. As FB6 declared, 
preparation of the organization was key: “My suggestion to the organization is that it 
should continue its job, strengthen its team, and always prepare itself for things that 
might happen in ECOWAS community. So, it forces can intervene at the right time to 
address problems.” OK3 agreed, noting that ECOMOG needs “more strength,” as well as 
more training and equipment, “because they are fighting for the interest of our ECOWAS 
community; so that this organization can last forever. So, that it will continue, continue, 
continue helping countries that are infected with war.” HT9 suggested that ECOWAS 
focus on expanding their military efforts: “I would like for ECOWAS to continue these 
developments and then to put more effort towards the peacekeeping of some nations in 
Africa.” 
 However, some participants focused on remedying the wrongs committed by 
ECOMOG. More specifically, three respondents implored the organization to, as OK3 
said, “change some of their bad tricks.”AG7 was more specific and explicit in making 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG forces more “disciplined and professional in their duties.” This 
included doing the following: 
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Avoid following 12- and 13-years old girls, impregnate underage girls, use black 
magic on young women, vaginate teenagers (to forcefully take young girls’ 
virginity), extrajudicial killings, and rape while trying to maintain stable peace in 
the country. In short, ECOWAS/ECOMOG forces must change their attitudes and 
stay focus on the mission with discipline, professional, and uphold a high moral 
standard in all deploying countries.  
In a similar vein, AJ1 described the need for accountability for the crimes that 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG forces committed, primarily through some sort of enforcement 
arrangement: “They need a structure whereby they could try somebody, and they could 
even try their own soldiers, like a military tribunal to discipline them. So, they are not 
getting away with it, and they're not hiding behind the pretext of war.” 
Finally, two other participants had other suggestions for ECOWAS/ECOMOG. 
For MB8, the organization needed to work on their communication skills, particularly in 
listening and understanding:  
They've got to understand to be patient with us. They've got to work with us and 
listen to our problems. They got to fight for us. They got to make sure that this is 
our right, this is our place, and this is our thing. 
For AJ1, another issue is procedural alterations. More specifically, AJ1 noted that 
“We still we have border issues and you can't travel sometimes.” While ECOWAS 
countries had promised a universal “ECOWAS passports,” which would allow members 
to “travel freely and do business freely within the West Africa region,” no such 
movement occurred. As the participant said, “We're still waiting around.” However, the 
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most outstanding theme among the emerging topics was public support, which linked all 
of them to itself. COIN and CR must achieve public support first to lay down the 
framework for legitimacy and then move to manage the conflict (Galula, 2006; Kilcullen, 
2010). Table 10 shows the importance of public support, and it links to the rest of the 
themes: 
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Table 10 
 
Popular Support Theme 
Popular Support 
code  
Participants’ perceptions about 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG role in Sierra 
Leone war. 
Interview questions & 
documents that relate 
to theme/codes. 
Supporters & 
legitimacy 
ECOWAS gains public support from 
local, regional, and international 
communities. 
1-10  
Intervention & force ECOMOG attains general support from 
citizens, a regional body, and the global 
community to stop the war. 
1-10  
Trust & psychology Rebuild and improve the reliable 
relationship with the public, Sierra 
Leone government, and regional 
community.  
1-10  
COIN & CR for all 
themes 
Bring all warring parties together for 
peace settlements. 
1-10  
Challenges, 
family/community 
needs, & identity 
needs, 
Accept constructive criticism 
(ECOMOG, Sierra Leone government, 
and UN). 
1-10  
Reconciliation ECOWAS and UN facilitate the Lomé 
Peace Agreement between RUF and 
Sierra Leone government for peace.  
1-10  
Friendship Try to forgive for peace purpose  1-10  
Disarmament & 
security needs 
Disarm all combatants in the bloody 
war. 
1-10  
Train/Professional 
& forces 
Train former combatant and Sierra 
Leone forces for peaceful integration 
1-10  
Re-build society COIN, CR, and peace processes require 
everyone’s effort.  
1-10  
Rape 
underage/women & 
sexual assault 
Must be addressed by all parties in the 
civil war. 
1-10  
Indiscriminate 
killings 
More training and must be addressed.  1-10  
Instruction/guidance 
& recommendations 
All parties are a willingness to be 
mentored and trained effectively. 
1-10  
Appreciation and 
love 
The local population, government, and 
some international community 
1-10  
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appreciations for ECOMOG but with 
some observational caution.  
 
Note. Codes = Characteristics of ECOWAS public support efficacy for COIN & CR. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
The qualitative researcher does not possess a solitary specific technique to 
validate the quality of findings and ethical concerns in a research inquiry. Nonetheless, 
this should not be perceived as a weakness in the authentication procedures of the 
qualitative study. However, trustworthiness, credibility, and authenticity are more 
commonly employed than validity and reliability in qualitative studies (Creswell, 2013; 
Patton, 2002). Trochim (2001) argued that validation procedures in qualitative findings 
should be based on the framework of trustworthiness, dependability, and credibility. The 
APA (2010) and Creswell (2009, 2013) maintained that credibility should reflect and 
explain in detail the worldview of the people that experienced the phenomena (as in the 
case of the conflict in Sierra Leone).  
In this qualitative case study design, I utilized various resources of data, deriving 
an explanation of events, peer-review, and a member-checking authentication of research 
outcomes (APA, 2010; Creswell, 2009; Levitt et al., 2018; Yin, 2013). I shared the 
preliminary results with those who were concerned with this investigation for credibility. 
Also, I presented an exhaustive account of the events under study as a way for others to 
examine it properly and for a feasible application or generalization in other forms. The 
measures were placed to strengthen the credibility, trustworthiness, dependability, and 
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authenticity of the study (Creswell, 2009, 2013). I emphasized the importance of the 
issues of ethics in all aspects of the research (i.e., from preliminary data collection, 
interviews, documents, field notes, language, analysis, interpretation, and presentation). 
Additionally, the member-checking method for all transcribed interview validated 
the raw data sources that were manually coded and used qualitative software program. 
All participants authenticated their credentials orally/written and signed a consent form to 
meet the criteria that permitted them to participate in the research study. The contents of 
interviews, documents, and field noted provided answers that were aligned with the 
research questions about the description of ECOWAS’s role in COIN and CR to sustain a 
durable peace settlement in Sierra Leone. At the end of the data collection procedure, I 
established the credibility and purpose for study. Furthermore, to ensure credibility, 
trustworthiness, and dependability, I grounded the study on the guidance of the 
dissertation committee, Walden University guidelines, qualitative rules, and APA (2010) 
criteria for a qualitative inquiry study.  
Confirmability 
 I conserved prudence and precaution during the study to keep the integrity and 
general principles of qualitative research. Additionally, I withstood the scrutiny of a peer-
review investigation as every facet was clarified via the guidance, experts’ 
recommendations, and university regulations. I adhered to the qualitative method 
protocol of case study approach of in-depth analysis of multiple sources for data 
credibility and confirmability (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2013).  
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 The interview protocol, document data, field notes, and participant consent form 
facilitated perpetuity during the data gathering procedure. Likewise, interaction with the 
participants was managed in a specific way. The tools used to collect information and 
emerging themes, code, and classifications were constant throughout the interviews, 
documents, and field noted processes. Meticulousness was under the guidance of 
instruction in managing the approaches of the research; thus, a stable and wealthy 
information study could be offered to the scientific society.  
 Additionally, the literature and credible sources aided the research study vis-à-vis 
to the emerging themes, documents, and field notes discussed previously would serve as 
a vital learning apparatus for ECOWAS future operations. During the interview process, 
the participants spoke about the positive changes ECOWAS/ECOMOG brought in their 
lives. Their passion, concurring body language, composure, and tenacity were indications 
of their experiences of ECOMOG’s role in Sierra Leone civil war had made life changes 
in the bloody situation. 
Transferability 
 Ensuring transferability, the study was performed based on the guidance of the 
Dissertation Committee, university guidelines, qualitative methods, and the Manual, all 
requirements of a qualitative study. The data collected, managed, and analyzed can be 
replicated by researchers. Likewise, further research may be needed to understand 
ECOWAS’ role in COIN and CR to sustain durable peace in Sierra Leone (and the region 
that is facing terrorist attacks in Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, etc.).    
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Dependability  
 The study was designed and performed using the basic qualitative approach of 
case study design (Creswell, 2013).  I collected data from Sierra Leoneans with 
experience and knowledge of the civil war. The merits of this study were performed, and 
the setting of the data collected provides proof of the dependable nature of the study. The 
data or findings could be replicated using the similar principles as reported.  The correct 
evaluation or assessment of dependability might be found in the dedicated curiosity of 
any person searching and following the facts of this research study. 
Researcher Bias  
 In employing the case study approach, it was important that I upheld an open-
minded attitude through the research study (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2013). Precaution and 
attentiveness overcame in presenting information sources in its trustworthy novel setting. 
Self-assessment was a core habitual that was regularly in the vanguard of my thoughts as 
I led every day’s data collection for the research study. The fundamental principle that 
guided the study to evade one’s biases and adding individual immersion in the research 
has to do with adherent to the policies and guidelines of the university and dissertation 
committee.   
Summary 
The first research question of this study examined the strategic processing tools 
ECOWAS employed in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain durable 
peace in Sierra Leone. Within the first research questions, five themes emerged: popular 
support, legitimacy, force, psychological, and civic. Each of these themes examined how 
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respondents characterized and understood the types of strategic processing tools used by 
ECOWAS.  
The first major theme explored how ECOWAS/ECOMOG could garner popular 
support from the citizens in Sierra Leone. Such support, while not always absolute, still 
outweighed any doubts about the organization. Indeed, all 10 participants (100%) noted 
that ECOWAS/ECOMOG earned their backing. The second major theme was legitimacy, 
which was described by 9 out of the 10 participants (90%). In this way, participants noted 
that ECOWAS/ECOMOG had legitimacy as an organization (and were able to garner 
popular support) because of two main factors: their willingness to fight on behalf of 
Sierra Leone, and their ability to bring peace. The third major theme that emerged from 
the first research question was a force. In this theme, participants noted that the ability of 
ECOMOG to fight and use military power was essential in not only garnering popular 
support and offering legitimacy to the organization but also in ultimately obtaining peace. 
The fourth theme to come from the first research question was psychological, which 
explored how ECOWAS/ECOMOG employed psychological tools to help with the 
resolution process. These methods were explained differently by each participant. The 
final theme in the first research question was civic tools, which was cited by three (30%) 
of the participants. Within this theme, participants considered how ECOWAS helped to 
create productive political relationships. 
The second research question explored how strategic processing tools sustained 
durable peace in Sierra Leone, and within this second research question, there were three 
major themes: family/community needs, identify needs, and security needs. Each of these 
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themes contributed to the legitimacy, as well as popular support, of 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG. The first theme from the second research question was 
family/community needs, which was cited by 7 of the 10 participants (70%). Within this 
theme, participants discussed how ECOWAS contributed to the material and economic 
needs of the people of Sierra Leone. The second theme from the second research question 
was identity needs, which considered how ECOWAS/ECOMOG helped instill a sense of 
recognition and acceptance of one’s identity, while also addressing an understanding of 
others. Four of the 10 participants (40%) cited this theme. The final theme for the second 
research question, cited by 4 of the 10 participants (40%) was security needs. In this 
theme, participants discussed the psychological and physical impact ECOMOG had on 
individuals’ sense of security and safety. 
The third research question, which explored the issues that influenced the 
effectiveness of ECOWAS had three themes, all of which addressed the challenges—and 
possible solutions—for and of ECOWAS. The first two themes—sexual assault and 
fatalities—were significant problems that came with ECOWAS/ECOMOG’s 
intervention. The final theme—recommendations—proposes ways that ECOWAS could 
change to help overcome certain obstacles. Ninety percent of participants noted that the 
effectiveness of ECOWAS/ECOMOG, including their claims to legitimacy and popular 
support, were tampered if not severely damaged, by extra-judicial killings. Moreover, 
seventy percent contended the ECOMOG participated in the rape of civilian women. 
However, these crimes did not undercut the popular support and legitimacy of 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG. The final theme was recommendations, in which participants 
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advised how to change and fix aspects of ECOWAS/ECOMOG. Within this theme, there 
were four subthemes: organizational changes, discipline, future endeavors, and among 
others. This case study design derived data from multiple sources of interviews, 
documents, and field notes about ECOWAS’s role in COIN and CR to sustain a durable 
peace settlement in Sierra Leone.  
Chapter five is the last of the research study report. In this chapter, I elucidated 
how the literature highlights the emerging themes and results of the data analysis. Also, I 
gave particulars and understandings into the findings’ interpretation, limitations of the 
research, recommendations, implications of social change, and the conclusion of the case 
study investigation.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this qualitative, explanatory case study was to explore the 
strategic processing tools used as part of ECOWAS’s counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution efforts to sustain durable peace in Sierra Leone from 1991-2002. Additionally, 
I analyzed the impact of available resources on ECOMOG’s mission in terms of its 
success and/or failure in the conflict resolution process. Most regional countries continue 
to lack the institutional capabilities and strategic tools to manage internal or cross-conflict 
crises in their sovereignties (Davies, 2010). Consequently, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea 
Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Mali have not been able to defend 
their borders or citizens from violent conflicts (Cham, 2012; Francis, 2009; Olonisakin, 
2004). Regional leader created ECOWAS for economic cooperation and social 
development; ECOMOG was subsequently formed to protect regional stability and peace 
(Davies, 2010). Despite ECOWAS’s storied involvement in regional conflicts, 
researchers have paid little attention to the importance of strategic processing tools in 
ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict resolution, according to my review of the literature. I 
aimed to fill this gap in the literature by conducting this study.  
I conducted face-to-face interviews with 10 participants, all of whom had 
experienced ECOWAS’s role in COIN and CR to sustain a durable peace settlement in 
the Sierra Leone civil war. Moreover, I used documents from the Sierra Leone 
government, ECOWAS sources (such as the ECOWAS Protocol, Lomé Peace 
Agreement), UN Human Rights Report, and other scholarly sources to examine 
ECOWAS’s role in Sierra Leone war for this case study. In addition to the interviews and 
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documentary sources, I retained a journal to record my daily field notes and observations 
during the course of the study.  
After analyzing all three sources of data in phases, which included data managing, 
reading, writing, describing, coding/classifying, analyzing, interpreting, and presenting 
the findings of this study, I concluded that ECOWAS/ECOMOG was successful in their 
intervention by utilizing a combination of soft and hard power. This soft power took the 
form of popular support and legitimacy of the organization from the local, regional, and 
the international community, as well as psychological factors. Moreover, the use of hard 
power or force—as a military authority—provided ECOWAS/ECOMOG with both the 
aforementioned popular support and legitimacy. Also, the ECOWAS sustained impact 
was premised on fulfilling identity needs, offering a sense of self and community, as well 
providing material goods and physical security, which acted as a tangible form of power 
that helped sustain and cement their influence in the region. However, the findings 
highlighted significant challenges posed by ECOMOG’s use of extra-judicial killings and 
sexual assaults; while such brutalities did not change the cost-benefit analysis of the 
participants’ attitudes toward the organization, such outrages complicated people’s 
perceptions of ECOMOG and possibly tainted its future endeavors in conflict resolution.  
In the sections that follow, I review the results of the study as they pertain to the 
three research questions and the extant literature, interpreting the findings within the 
context of the research. I discussed the implications and limitations of the findings, and 
recommendations for both the research and implementation will be made. A summary 
will conclude this chapter. 
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Interpretations of the Findings 
Regarding the first two research questions, the findings of this study largely 
reinforced the extant literature on counterinsurgency and conflict resolution. Indeed, the 
themes discovered aligned with the literature on the theoretical framework (Galula, 
1964), as well as more contemporary research regarding the strategic tools used to reach 
productive outcomes for any conflict resolution settlement (see Burton, 1990b; 
Bercovitch & Jackson; 2009; Byrne & Senehi; 2009). However, the results of the third 
research question, which concerned extra-judicial killings and rape, were not addressed in 
the literature I reviewed; the participants’ perceptions of these crimes had a negative 
impinging on the effectiveness of ECOMOG mission; thus, add to the work on 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution. 
The first research question of this study centered on the strategic processing tools 
ECOWAS employed in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to sustain durable 
peace in Sierra Leone. Regarding the first research question, five themes emerged: 
popular support, legitimacy, force, psychological, and civic. All of these themes, in 
different ways, echoed and reinforced the extant literature (Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 
2010).  
Findings related to the first major theme, which centered on how 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG could garner popular support from the citizens in Sierra Leone, 
were consistent with the conclusions of extant conflict resolution literature which show 
that gaining the support and consent of the people and encouraging public participation 
are vital elements for counterinsurgency success (Galula, 2006; Hack, 2009; R. 
133 
 
Thompson, 1966; Tse-tung, 1938). Kilcullen (2009, 2010) further summarized 
counterinsurgency as competition to win the favor of the population, while Galula (1964), 
within the theoretical framework of this study, similarly argued that the first law was that 
the population’s support is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as it was for the 
insurgent. All 10 participants (100%) noted that ECOWAS/ECOMOG earned their 
backing. However, while such popular support was not always absolute, the participants 
of this study felt the good that ECOWAS/ECOMOG performed still outweighed any 
doubts about the organization. However, popular support also gets a function of backing 
from outside organizations, including Human Rights Watch (1999) and the United 
Nations Security Council, which considers the conflict in Sierra Leone as a threat to the 
global peace and security for the subregion (Bamfo, 2013; Davies, 2010; Dumbuya, 
2008). In this way, ECOWAS garnered popular support because of both the backing of 
the international community and the local and regional society.  
The second major theme, legitimacy, also coincided with and strengthened the 
claims of prior research that legitimacy is essential to promoting peace as a tool for 
conflict resolution (Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010, Petraeus & Amos, 2006). Indeed, 9 out 
of 10 people, which was 90% of participants described ECOWAS/ECOMOG as a 
legitimate organization. For the participants of this study, ECOWAS/ECOMOG had 
legitimacy as an organization and was able to garner popular support because of two 
main factors: its willingness to fight on behalf of Sierra Leone and its ability to bring 
peace. In this way, while the concept of legitimacy coincides with the literature, the 
definition of such legitimacy differs somewhat from prior research. Galula (1964) and 
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Kilcullen (2010) asserted that legitimacy is created by strong, just leaders who provide 
security, personal development, and political opportunity, and eradicate corruption. 
Legitimacy allows authorities to perform their duties easily, as well as manage the 
populace’s interactions and resources and act legally on their behalf (Coker, 2012). 
Ultimately, these authors argue that counterinsurgency is supposed to help host nations or 
authorities establish an effective, legitimate government that can address the needs of the 
masses. In this literature, legitimacy is constructed as the lawful rule of the government 
through a free political process. However, according to the participants of this study, a 
structured government and institutions was not necessarily an indicator of legitimacy. 
Instead, the findings of this study support a definition of legitimacy as occurring through 
successful conflict resolution and an end to the war.  
Conversely, if legitimacy is understood as a political process that allows 
authorities to execute their duties easily and controls the public’s interactions and 
resources to act lawfully on their behalf (Coker, 2012; Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010), 
then ECOWAS can be understood as reinforcing the literature. This definition of 
legitimacy, however, serves as a function of the Sierra Leone government, regional bloc, 
and the UN Security Council, rather than the perceptions of the participants themselves. 
The Revised Treaty of the 24 July 1993 Summit (Atuobi, 2011; ECOWAS Commission, 
2010), the Sierra Leone government invitation of ECOWAS under President Kabbah, the 
African Union, United Kingdom, United States, and United Nations all supported the 
legalized ECOMOG role in Sierra Leone to halt the bloody civil war, offering legitimacy 
as defined by this latter definition.  
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A force emerged as the third major theme that came from the first research 
question. In this theme, participants noted that the ability of ECOMOG to fight and use 
military power was essential in not only garnering popular support and offering 
legitimacy to the organization but also in ultimately obtaining peace. Such an 
understanding of the importance of military might be endorsed by the literature, which 
often characterized this strategic tool as a kinetic force.  
The use of kinetic force refers to the exercise of the power to end inter- or intra-
conflict among conflicting parties and has been supported by scholars including Levy 
(1998), Machiavelli (as cited in Lynch, 2012), Morgenthau (1948), and Waltz (1959). 
According to Petraeus and Amos (2006) and Kilcullen (2010), using kinetic force aimed 
to eliminate insurgents’ networks, potential supports, and cells. Such a force was 
essential, according to the participants in this study, which emphasized the need for a 
professional and trained military force to accomplish peace. However, while TRC agreed 
with participants as far as ECOMOG had served as the surrogate national Army, then the 
report did not consider the forces valuable. In this way, there was a contradiction between 
the perceptions of the participants and the post-mortem report on ECOWAS/ECOMOG 
(Human Rights Watch Report, 1999; Humper et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, Galula (2006b, 1964) argued that the counterinsurgency forces 
should only use kinetic force 20% of the time to establish security, and should use non-
kinetic force the remaining 80% of the time to win popular support. While the findings 
outside organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch Report (1999), seem to confirm 
such a position, given the varied themes of soft and hard power that were successful, it is 
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significant to note that many of these non-kinetic force tactics were successful because of 
the use of kinetic force. Participants described popular support and legitimacy as a 
function of the achievement of ECOMOG’s military force.  
The fourth theme to come from the first research question was psychological, 
which explored how ECOWAS/ECOMOG employed psychological tools to help with the 
resolution process. While these methods were explained differently by each participant, 
three described the psychological element of ECOMOG to be the negation or at least 
diminishment of the psychological warfare the atrocities wrought against them had 
brought. This perception indicated a correlation to prior research that asserted that 
counterinsurgency strategies must inspire public trust and confidence, as well as make the 
population feel secure despite negative insurgent influence (Kilcullen, 2009). More 
specifically, Galula (1964, 2006a), Kilcullen (2010), Mantas (2013), and Petraeus et al., 
(2009) argued that the psychological warfare of winning the hearts and minds of the 
populations was an important approach to win a war against insurgency in the COIN and 
CR strategies, which aligned with the participants’ perceptions of ECOMOG. However, 
while previous literature indicated this psychological, strategic tool was a function of 
building strong police and military force or a relationship between the military and 
civilians (Galula, 2006a), the conclusions of this study indicated that no such formal 
structure was needed to arouse comfort and security. Instead, the military successes 
themselves acted as a psychological, strategic tool. 
The second research question explored how strategic processing tools sustained 
durable peace in Sierra Leone, and within this second research question, there were three 
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major themes: family/community needs, identify needs, and security needs. Each of these 
themes contributed to the legitimacy, as well as popular support, of 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG. Moreover, each of these themes directly correlated to three of 
Burton’s (1990) four common needs that serve as strategic tools to reach productive 
outcomes for any conflict resolution settlement. The different kinds of needs met for the 
citizens of Sierra Leone also reinforce Galula’s (1964) fourth law of counterinsurgency, 
which states that the intensity of the vastness of means and efforts are essential. The wide 
range of material and psychological support offered by ECOWAS/ECOMOG helped 
sustain their peace efforts, according to the participants of this study. 
The first theme from the second research question was family/community needs, 
which 7 of the 10 participants cited. Within this theme, participants discussed how 
ECOWAS contributed to the material and economic needs of the people of Sierra Leone. 
As Burton (1990) noted that, this category included housing, education, healthcare, 
justice, and equality. The findings of this study primarily indicated the provisions of 
medicine and the use of hospitals, as well as clothing and housing. In this way, 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG provided these material goods, it could gain a sense of legitimacy, 
exhibiting willpower to convince the people that socioeconomic conditions are improving 
in the state (Austin, 2009; Galula, 2006a; Thompson, 1966). Such perceptions were not 
only aligned with the extant literature, but also with the ECOWAS (2008), TRC (2004), 
ECOWAS (2010), the Lomé peace agreement (1999), and the UN Human Rights Watch 
Report (1999), which noted that the organization’s purpose was, in part, to offer 
humanitarian aid. 
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The second theme from the second research question was identity needs, which 
looked at how ECOWAS/ECOMOG helped instill a sense of recognition and acceptance 
of one’s identity, while also addressing an understanding of others. Four of the 10 
participants cited this theme. As Huffman (2009) noted that, conflict results from the 
sense that one’s identity was in danger, which led to the feeling that one must fight to 
survive. Conversely, the exercise of soft power can manifest in the form of engaging, 
providing and managing the needs of the people to garner support against insurrection 
(Beck, 2006; Easton, 1989; Frederick, 2012). Helping citizens of Sierra Leone to 
maintain their national and personal identity was an essential part of the legitimacy and 
popular support that ECOWAS/ECOMOG accrued. Indeed, the literature has noted that 
the political identity of recognizing individuals and solving their needs is a powerful tool 
in COIN and CR strategies to gain public support over the insurgency propaganda 
(Doucey, 2011; Galula, 2006). 
The final theme for the second research question, cited by four of the ten 
participants, was security needs, which was described by Burton (1999) as the need for 
stability and well-being. In this theme, participants discussed the psychological and 
physical impact ECOMOG had on individuals’ sense of security and safety. As DM5 
noted that, the organization could “protect some towns and cities,” or as SK2 said, 
“establish law and order.” Hill (2012) discussed the importance of fulfilling this security 
need, saying that without security, the elements mentioned previously would be useless. 
The lack of security may lead to threatening violence against the populace’s safety; as a 
result, the insurgents might provide welfare programs that win them support or 
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undermine the legitimacy of the government (Hills, 2012). ECOWAS (2008), TRC 
(2004), ECOWAS (2010), the Lomé peace agreement (1999), and the United Nations 
Security Council under Chapter VII and VIII supported ECOMOG to address and 
provide security needs for the Sierra Leone populace. Law and order are additionally 
essential to a government’s legitimacy to reap support from the public and purge 
insurgents (Austin, 2009; Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2010). 
However, participants made no mention of Burton’s (1990) fourth need, which 
was personal needs that included the development and achievement of one’s potential in 
society. According to Burton (1990), the failure to meet these stated needs would result in 
conflict. Moreover, Cook- Huffman (1990), Burton (1990), and Doucey (2011) argued 
that sustainable peace could not be achieved if the primary needs of people were absent 
and/or excluded from the process. Notwithstanding, the participants of this study 
demonstrated that meeting at least a majority of these needs, including community, 
identity, and security, was sufficient to create a lasting peace.  
The third research question, which explored the issues that influenced the 
effectiveness of ECOWAS, and two of the major themes (i.e., sexual assault and 
fatalities) were significant problems that came with ECOWAS/ECOMOG’s intervention. 
Ninety percent of participants stated that the effectiveness of ECOWAS/ECOMOG, 
including their claims to legitimacy and popular support, were tampered if not badly 
damaged, by extra-judicial killings. Moreover, 70% contended that the ECOMOG 
participated in the rape of civilian women. However, these crimes did not undercut the 
popular support and legitimacy of ECOWAS/ECOMOG. 
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The perceptions were only tangentially supported by the extant literature. Burton 
(1990) and Fisher (2009) cautioned that conflict resolution requires decision-making that 
avoided using force or external extortion to get to the cause of the issue. In addition, 
researchers have noted that unnecessary killings and violence against innocent people 
might lessen public support, legitimacy, and trust for the intervening forces (e.g., Galula, 
1964; Kilcullen, 2010; Mantas, 2013; Petraeus et al., 2009). However, these themes as 
specifically related to the Sierra Leone conflict were not present in the literature I 
reviewed. The ECOMOG challenges may be specific to the particular socio-historical and 
political context, or it could be because prior research has not queried citizens of Sierra 
Leone or other countries that were recipients of ECOWAS/ECOMOG military force. 
Despite this absence, these themes that emerged from the final research question can be 
seen in relation to the theoretical framework of this study. Galula (1963, 1964) warned 
that using kinetic force can lead to failure; Galula (1964) also argued in his third law that 
supports from the population was conditional. In this way, the findings of this study 
indicated that too much kinetic force could be a reason extra-judicial killings and sexual 
assaults occurred; this type of force created a failure of winning complete popular support 
and legitimacy.  
Limitations 
Understanding the limitations of this study starts with recognizing and controlling 
my subjectivity and bias during the collection and interpretation of the data (Creswell, 
2009; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Patton, 2002). Another potential limitation 
was that some of the data collection was based on participants' decades-old memories. 
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Additionally, access to government and ECOWAS documents were limited to outsiders 
due to bureaucratic barriers to data. For example, I traveled to Sierra Leone in July 2014 
to collect materials on ECOWAS’s role in the country's civil conflict. The processes of 
obtaining data were slow and took weeks before I gained access due to bureaucratic 
protocol. Also, documents were not well archived or organized because some 
departments of the government were undergoing transition. Most importantly, the 
unprecedented 2014 outbreak of Ebola created widespread panic across the region, 
forcing authorities to focus more on health issues rather than data collection. The 
previous issues confined my timely access to data. However, Creswell (2007, 2014) and 
Rudestam and Newton (2015) noted that the case study design is flexible, which might 
allow a researcher to collect different types of data sources for information, 
interpretation, and analysis.  
The research scope was limited to the role of ECOWAS/ ECOMOG in Sierra 
Leone’s civil war, participants from Sierra Leoneans, the regional body, and NGOs that 
experienced the bloody conflict. As I focused on exploring ECOWAS’s role in Sierra 
Leone only, the results might not be generalizable to other regions without further study 
due to economic, cultural, social, and political differences between regions. 
Finally, I limited participation in the study to individuals in Sierra Leone and New 
York State who experienced the civil war. Thus, the perspective of ECOWAS members 
directly involved in the counterinsurgency was included in the study.  
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Recommendations 
Given the results of this study, there are a few recommendations to be made. 
Sanctions should be imposed on crimes committed by ECOMOG, including extra-
judicial killings and rape. The regional body should impose strict sanctions on any person 
who engages in these illegal acts, regardless of their country or body of origin. This act 
will ensure that ECOWAS forces fully abide by the international humanitarian law, 
particularly concerning the protection of civilians and civilian objects. A disciplinary unit 
should be set up to oversee the imposition of military discipline within the various 
ECOWAS contingents and to address violations of international humanitarian law and 
other serious abuses by ECOWAS troops. This act will help contribute to both the 
legitimacy and popular support of the organization, and assist in managing a future 
conflict in the subregion. The ECOWAS Revised Treaty (1993) the Lomé Peace Accord 
(1999), and the Human Rights Watch (1999) Report have stressed the need to solve these 
issues noted previously among all those involved in the civil war. 
To enable ECOWAS to avoid problems such as extra-judicial killings and rape; 
thus, ECOWAS soldiers must receive the appropriate training in international human 
rights and humanitarian law before a mission. Also, the soldiers should get training on 
lessons learned from previous operations, precisely at the three ECOWAS training and 
education centers of excellence. Furthermore, mission objectives, as well as scope, 
should be as clearly articulated as possible right from the onset. Vision, concepts, 
doctrine, and procedures should not be limited to only peacekeeping. This act will help 
keep the organization structured and on-task. 
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While ECOWAS can project forces for peace operations and to modify its 
organizational structure, it does not have the economic capacity to manage and resolve 
conflicts without external assistance. ECOWAS is also not positioned to unilaterally 
intervene and end the conflict in a member state and without the support of the United 
Nations. Although there is the political will to do so and protocols to facilitate such 
interventions, the funds, coordination, and structures required are not available. The 
smaller and weaker economies of member states are the cause of these states of affairs 
making it impossible for ECOWAS to raise funds for interventions. Thus, the members 
should give more money to the organization; likewise, they should maintain strong ties 
with the United Nations and the African Union.  
Implications 
The results of this study plan to provide propositions for ECOWAS and other 
relevant groups on how to manage potential insurrection, terrorism, or conflict in the 
subregion effectively, such as that caused by Boko Haram in Nigeria or Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb in Mali. The formation of ECOWAS with its attendant responsibility in 
conflict management in the subregion remains the pivotal step that should be maintained 
to match the prevalence of armed conflict in several parts of West Africa; this study can 
help optimize the work of ECOWAS. 
Also, this study aims to help regional leaders and policymakers to formulate 
strategic policies to control insurgency, counterinsurgency, and conflict resolution and 
prevention in the region. Likewise, the study intends to provide ECOWAS with strategies 
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that can be used to produce positive social change and peaceful coexistence between all 
peoples in a region, such as conflict-ridden territories in Sierra Leone.  
Finally, the study contributes to the literature on counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution, by detailing the strategic processing tools used to maintain a durable peace in 
Sierra Leone that is currently absent from the literature. Moreover, the research can also 
be of great use to students of Peace and Conflict Studies. The challenges and success that 
outlined in this study can aid students in obtaining a more nuanced understanding of the 
art of negotiation and conflict management. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this qualitative, explanatory case study was to explore the 
strategic processing tools of ECOWAS's role in the counterinsurgency and conflict 
resolution efforts to sustain durable peace in Sierra Leone. Additionally, this study 
analyzed the impact of available resources on ECOMOG's mission in terms of its success 
and/or failure in the conflict resolution process. 
The results of this study indicated that ECOWAS/ECOMOG was successful in 
their intervention by utilizing a combination of soft and hard power. This soft power took 
the form of popular support and legitimacy of the organization, as well as psychological 
factors. In addition, the organization’s sustained impact was premised on fulfilling 
identity needs, offering a sense of self and community. Also, using force—as a military 
authority—provided ECOWAS/ECOMOG with both the aforementioned popular support 
and legitimacy. Besides, their provision of material goods and physical security acted as a 
tangible form of power that helped sustain and cement their influence in the region. 
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However, the findings of this study also found significant challenges posed 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG’s use of extra-judicial killings and sexual assaults; while such 
brutalities did not change the cost-benefit analysis of the participants’ attitudes towards 
the organization, such outrages complicated the perception of ECOWAS/ECOMOG, and 
possible tainted future endeavors.  
Overall, these findings—particularly within the first two research questions—
largely reinforced the extant literature on conflict resolution. Indeed, the themes 
discovered aligned with the literature of both the theoretical framework of (Galula, 1964), 
as well as more modern research as to the strategic tools used to reach productive 
outcomes for any conflict resolution settlement. However, the results of the third research 
question—which explored the crimes of extra-judicial killings and rape—were not 
addressed in the literature; the participants’ perceptions of these elements impinging on 
the effectiveness of ECOWAS/ECOMOG added to the work on conflict resolution. 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
1. What were some phenomena that influenced ECOWAS leadership to engage in 
counterinsurgency and conflict resolution to maintain peaceful settlement in Sierra 
Leone? 
2. What were some negative factors that pushed ECOWAS to deploy military forces 
(ECOMOG) to the conflicted zone? 
3. What do you like or dislike about ECOWAS/ECOMOG’s role to sustain peaceful 
solutions in Sierra Leone’s civil war? 
4. What are the positive and negative developments ECOMOG brought to the conflicted 
areas? 
5. In a few words, how would you assess the performance of ECOMOG in Sierra 
Leone? 
6. Would you recommend the continuation of the organization? How and what would 
you do or suggest to improve the organization? 
7. Would you like to add anything to the discussion before we end the interview? 
Additionally, would you recommend anybody (or location) who has experienced the 
conflict for an interview visit? 
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